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Informed Trading and Its Regulation   
Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, & Gabriel V. Rauterberg* 
 
Informed trading—trading on information not yet reflected in a stock’s price—
drives the stock market. Such informational advantages can arise from astute analysis of 
varied pieces of public news, from just released public information, or from confidential 
information from inside a firm. We argue that these disparate types of trading are all 
better regulated as part of the broader phenomenon of informed trading. Informed 
trading makes share prices more accurate, enhancing the allocation of capital, but also 
makes markets less liquid, which is costly to the efficiency of trade. Informed trading thus 
poses a fundamental trade-off in how it affects the two principal functions served by the 
stock market—information and liquidity. 
This Article takes this basic tradeoff and develops an analytic framework, drawing 
on microstructure economics, modern finance theory, and the theory of the firm, to 
identify which types of informed trade are socially desirable, which are undesirable, and 
how best to regulate the market as a result. A key observation is that the time horizon of 
the information on which an informed trade is based—the latency before it would 
otherwise be reflected in price—crucially determines both the strategies of those trading 
on it and the social value of such trading. 
Disaggregating traders and trading strategies in this way provides powerful new 
insights into how we can use regulation to deter socially undesirable forms of informed 
trading and promote socially desirable ones. The central contribution of this Article is 
the systematic application of the insights of our framework to illuminate a vast array of 
legal rules and doctrines—typically considered in isolation—in light of their effects on 
different kinds of informed trade. These include Rule 10b-5 as applied to insider trading, 
Exchange Act Section 16(b), Reg. NMS, mandatory disclosure rules, Reg. FD, New 
York’s so-called “Insider Trading 2.0”policy, and various stock exchange regulations. 
The Article thus lays the foundation for evaluating this array of rules, and on this basis 
suggests a series of reforms to the current framework of securities law. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 821 
 
* Michael E. Patterson Professor of Law, NASDAQ Professor of the Law and Economics of Capital Markets, 
Columbia Law School; S. Sloan Colt Professor of Banking and International Finance, Columbia Business School; 
and Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan Law School, respectively. For particularly helpful comments, we are 
grateful to participants at the American Law and Economics Association 2016 Annual Meeting, American 
Association of Law Schools Securities Section 2017 Annual Meeting, and at faculty workshops at Columbia Law 
School and FGV-Sao Paulo Law School. 
 
 
818 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 43:4 
II. INFORMED TRADING’S EFFECT ON LIQUIDITY AND SHARE PRICE ACCURACY ........... 824 
A. Market Participants and Their Reasons for Trading ....................................... 825 
1. Informed Traders ........................................................................................ 825 
a. Fundamental Value Information ............................................................. 825 
b. Announcement Information .................................................................... 825 
c. Information from Inside an Issuer .......................................................... 825 
d. Information from Inside a Non-issuer Source ........................................ 826 
2. Uninformed Traders .................................................................................... 826 
3. Noise and Anti-noise Traders ...................................................................... 826 
4. Professional Liquidity Suppliers ................................................................. 827 
B. Trading Venues and Orders ............................................................................. 827 
C. Informed Trading and the Economics of Liquidity Provision .......................... 827 
1. The Liquidity Supply Business..................................................................... 827 
2. Transacting with Informed Versus Uninformed Traders ............................ 828 
3. The Liquidity Impact of an Anticipated Level of Informed Trading ............ 829 
4. The Pattern of Transaction Prices in the Presence of Informed Trading ... 830 
5. Adding in the Effects of Noise Traders and Anti-Noise Traders ................. 830 
III. THE EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK ................................................................................ 831 
A. Goals ................................................................................................................ 832 
B. Market Attributes that Impact These Goals ..................................................... 832 
1. Price Accuracy ............................................................................................ 832 
2. Liquidity ...................................................................................................... 833 
a. More Efficient Allocation of Resources over Time ................................. 833 
b. More Efficient Allocation of Risk ........................................................... 834 
c. Greater Share Price Accuracy................................................................ 834 
IV. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF INFORMED TRADING ......................... 834 
A. Fundamental Value Informed Trading ............................................................ 834 
1. Wealth Effects: The Ex-Post Perspective Through an Example .................. 835 
a. Informed Traders .................................................................................... 836 
b. Liquidity Suppliers ................................................................................. 836 
c. Uninformed Traders ............................................................................... 837 
2. Wealth and Resource Allocation Effects: The Ex-ante Perspective ............ 837 
a. Fundamental Value Informed Traders ................................................... 837 
b. Liquidity Suppliers ................................................................................. 838 
c. Anti-noise Traders .................................................................................. 838 
d. Uninformed Traders: Actual Costs and Their Ultimate Incidence ......... 838 
e. Uninformed Traders: Illusory Losses and Gains.................................... 839 
3. Fairness Analysis ........................................................................................ 839 
4. Efficiency Considerations ........................................................................... 840 
a. Positive Effects on Price Accuracy ......................................................... 840 
i. Trading Profits Create Incentives to Produce New Information ........ 841 
ii. Price Accuracy is Improved Over a Longer Span of Time ................ 841 
iii. Consequences for the Extent of Positive Impact on Economic 
Welfare .............................................................................................. 841 
b. Comparison of Benefits with Costs ......................................................... 842 
B. Announcement Information .............................................................................. 844 
1. Wealth Transfers and Fairness ................................................................... 844 
2018] Informed Trading and Its Regulation  819 
2. Efficiency Considerations ........................................................................... 845 
C. Inside Information: The Issuer as Source ........................................................ 845 
1. Wealth Transfers: Their Incentive and Fairness Effects ............................. 846 
a. Ex-post Perspective ................................................................................ 846 
b. Ex-ante Perspective ................................................................................ 847 
i. Issuer Insiders .................................................................................... 847 
ii. Liquidity Suppliers and Anti-noise Traders ....................................... 847 
iii. Uninformed Traders ......................................................................... 848 
iv. Fundamental Value Informed and Anti-noise Traders ..................... 849 
2. Efficiency Effects: Claimed Social Benefits ................................................ 849 
a. Price Accuracy Effects ............................................................................ 849 
i. Delaying Versus Accelerating Issuer Disclosure ............................... 849 
ii.  The Unimportance of Delay or Acceleration ................................... 850 
b. Managerial Compensation ..................................................................... 850 
i. Distorted Incentives to Choose Risk Over Expected Return ............... 851 
ii. Inefficient Allocation of Risk ............................................................. 851 
iii. Poorly Focused Reward for Performance and Distorted Internal 
Communications ............................................................................... 852 
3. Efficiency Considerations: Social Losses .................................................... 852 
4. Overall Policy Conclusions ......................................................................... 853 
a. Should Issuers be able to Consent to Insiders Trading? ........................ 853 
b. Insider Trading on Small Bits of Nonpublic Information ....................... 854 
c. Trading by Tippees ................................................................................. 855 
d. Trading by an Issuer Possessing Material Information or by Persons 
to Whom It Gives the Information ......................................................... 855 
D. Inside Information: A Non-Issuer Source ........................................................ 855 
1. Socially Desirable Trades ........................................................................... 856 
2. Socially Undesirable Trades ....................................................................... 857 
V. LEGAL REGULATION: DETERRING UNDESIRABLE INFORMED TRADING AND 
ENCOURAGING DESIRABLE INFORMED TRADING .................................................. 857 
A. Informed Trading Prohibitions ........................................................................ 857 
1. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: History of Development of the Current 
Law ............................................................................................................. 858 
a. The Early History of the Development of the Doctrine .......................... 858 
b. Chiarella and Its Aftermath .................................................................... 859 
i. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading ............................................ 859 
ii. The Misappropriation and Structural Access Theories ..................... 859 
iii. Tipper and Tippee Liability for Information Coming from within 
the Issuer ........................................................................................... 860 
iv. Tipper and Tippee Liability for Information Coming from within 
an Institution Other than the Issuer .................................................. 863 
v. Informed Trading by an Issuer .......................................................... 864 
2. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Evaluation .................................................. 865 
a. Fundamental Value Informed Trading ................................................... 865 
b. Announcement Information .................................................................... 865 
c. Inside Information: The Issuer as Source ............................................... 865 
d. Inside Information: A Non-issuer Source ............................................... 867 
820 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 43:4 
B. The Way Forward Under Rule 10b-5 ............................................................... 869 
1. Problems with the Existing Law Concerning Trading by Outsiders 
Based on Information Originating from within the Issuer of the Traded 
Shares ......................................................................................................... 870 
a. Personal Benefit in the Form of a Gift ................................................... 870 
b. Personal Benefit in the Form of a Quid Pro Quo ................................... 871 
c. An Alternative Approach to Outsiders Trading on Information 
Originating from Within the Issue ......................................................... 871 
d. The Substance of the Alternative Approach: The Insider Tipper and 
the Direct Tippee ................................................................................... 871 
i. Trades Based on Tips Made for Personal Benefit Reasons ................ 872 
ii. Trades Based on the Unauthorized Selective Disclosure of 
Information for Reasons Other than Personal Benefit ..................... 873 
iii. Trades Based on Authorized Selective Disclosure ........................... 873 
e. The Substance of the Alternative Approach: The Indirect Tippee .......... 873 
f. Implementation ....................................................................................... 874 
g. Trading by Outsiders on the Basis of Non-public Information 
Originating within Non-issuer Institutions ............................................ 876 
C. Use of the Martin Act Regulation to Stop Informed Trading ........................... 876 
1. Practices Not Prohibited by Rule 10b-5...................................................... 877 
2. The Successful Martin Act Campaign Against “Insider Trading 2.0.” ....... 877 
3. Evaluation ................................................................................................... 877 
a. Possible Uses by Outsiders of the Information They Generate about 
Issuers .................................................................................................... 878 
b. Using Generated Information to make a Public Announcement ............ 878 
c. Combining Providing the Information to Select Traders Privately with 
Subsequently Announcing It Publicly .................................................... 878 
D. The Broad Scale Legislative Approach to Informed Trading Prohibitions ..... 879 
1. EU Market Abuse Directive ........................................................................ 879 
a. Fundamental Value, Announcement, and Issuer Insider Informed 
Trading .................................................................................................. 879 
b. Tippers and Tippees with Regard to Information from within the Issuer
 ............................................................................................................... 880 
c. Trades Based on Information Originating from within a Non-issuer 
Institution ............................................................................................... 881 
 d. Summary ................................................................................................. 881 
              2. Insider Trading Prohibition Act ................................................................... 881 
a. Fundamental Value, Announcement, and Issuer Insider Informed 
Trading ............................................................................................. 882 
b. Tippers and Tippees with Regard to Information from within the 
Issuer ................................................................................................ 882 
c. Trades based on information originating from within a non-issuer 
institution .......................................................................................... 883 
3. An Alternative Approach ............................................................................. 884 
E. Mandatory Affirmative Disclosure .................................................................. 885 
1. The Relationship of Mandatory Affirmative Disclosure to Informed 
Trading ....................................................................................................... 885 
2018] Informed Trading and Its Regulation  821 
2. Regulation FD ............................................................................................. 886 
3. European Continuous Disclosure Regime .................................................. 888 
F. Return of Insider Profits ................................................................................... 888 
G. Market Structure Rules .................................................................................... 889 
1. Stock Exchange Announcement Rules ......................................................... 889 
2. Market Connection Regulation ................................................................... 889 
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 890 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Informed trading—trading on information or analysis not yet reflected in a stock’s 
price—drives much of the stock market.1 Such information enables a more accurate 
appraisal of a stock’s value than what its current price implies. The trader may have 
obtained this information from astute analysis of publicly available information, from 
public information that has just been disclosed and is not yet reflected in a stock’s price, or 
from confidential information possessed by the issuer of the stock or by another entity, 
such as a potential acquirer. 
No issue in securities law has garnered more attention from law and economics 
scholars and the larger public alike than insider trading, in which a trader transacts based 
on nonpublic information obtained from inside an issuer or another entity.2 The legal 
literature has thought far less about how the other forms of informed trading should be 
regulated and how current law in fact affects them already. The ambition of this article is 
to advance thinking on both fronts. To that end, we argue that both types of insider trading 
(by insiders within and without an issuer) are better regulated as part of the more general 
phenomenon of informed trading, and that securities regulation could better promote social 
welfare if it was designed with an awareness of what all types of informed trading have in 
common and how they differ.3 
The basics of microstructure economics reveal that informed trading leads to more 
 
 1.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 243 (2002) (explaining the pervasive role 
of trading in the stock market based on nonpublic information); Kenneth French & Richard Roll, Stock Return 
Variances: The Arrival of New Information and the Reaction of Traders, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 9 (1986) (discussing 
trading on private information). 
 2.  For just a sampling of seminal early work in this area, see HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE 
STOCK MARKET 131–45 (1966) [hereinafter MANNE, INSIDER TRADING] (arguing that insider trading is efficient 
because it promotes pricing accuracy and entrepreneurialism); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1, 21 (1993) (arguing that the prohibition on insider 
trading is best justified as a property right protection for information); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and 
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 343, 347–48 (1979) 
(analyzing the proper scope of the disclose-or-abstain rule); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 862 (1982) (arguing that permitting insider trading may be 
an efficient way to compensate corporate managers); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider 
Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1238–43 (2001) 
(arguing that widespread insider trading would drive market analysts out of business with deleterious 
consequences for the informational quality of securities prices); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply 
to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967) (arguing that insider trading may 
be injurious because it deters investors who perceive it as unfair from trading in securities). 
 3.  See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 194 (introducing a general idea of informed trading). 
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accurate share prices,4 which in turn increase the efficiency with which the economy 
allocates goods and services.5 However, informed trading also reduces market liquidity,6 
which makes trading costlier and leads to a variety of inefficiencies.7 There is thus a 
fundamental tradeoff in how informed trading affects the two principal social functions 
served by equity markets—providing accurate prices and facilitating liquidity. This Article 
takes this basic tradeoff and uses the tools of microstructure economics, modern finance 
theory, and the theory of the firm to try to identify which forms of informed trade are in 
fact socially desirable, which are socially undesirable, and how to best regulate the market 
as a result. More specifically, we argue that given this difficult tradeoff, two key factors 
are crucial to determining the social utility of a trading practice—the strength of any 
incentives it provides for the generation of new information by traders and what one could 
call the “counterfactual latency” of that trading practice—the period of time between when 
given information would come to be incorporated into a stock’s price with and without the 
given trading practice. The time horizon of the information on which an informed trade is 
based—the latency before it would otherwise be reflected in price—crucially determines 
both the strategies of those trading on it and the social value of such trading.8 
Disaggregating traders and trading strategies in this way provides powerful new insights 
into how we can use regulation to deter socially undesirable forms of informed trading and 
promote socially desirable ones. 
Essentially, the welfare case is strongest for promoting trading strategies where the 
prospect of profit generally induces robust information gathering activity and when the 
content of that information would not otherwise become reflected in public stock prices for 
a considerable period of time without that trading strategy. The case for permitting a 
strategy is weakest when the information-gathering incentives are weak and the 
information incorporated in price by the trading strategy would have rapidly become 
incorporated anyway. 
The emphasis we place on counterfactual latency leads us to ask some questions that 
seem to have been neglected previously. For instance, what is the typical latency between 
when an insider transacts based on material nonpublic information and when that 
information would have definitively otherwise been incorporated in stock price due to a 
public disclosure. We develop a dataset through coding SEC litigation releases to explore 
the typical time lag between when insider traders transact and when the information on 
which they trade would have otherwise become public—and report the results.9 
A central contribution of this Article is the systematic application of our framework’s 
insights to illuminate a vast array of legal rules and doctrines that importantly affect 
different kinds of informed trading, and how those rules might be reformed in light of this 
fact. Informed trading is currently affected by a complex, and far from coherent, jumble of 
 
 4.  See infra Part II.C.4. 
 5.  See infra Part III.B.1.  
 6.  See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 299–303; see also infra Part II.C.3. 
 7.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 8.  See Markus Baldauf & Joshua Mollner, High-Frequency Trading and Market Performance (Working 
Paper, Oct. 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2674767 (noting this basic microstructure trade-off). 
 9.  See Part IV.C.2.a.ii. 
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legal rules.10 Relevant federal provisions include rules coming out of the case law 
interpreting Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)11 
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder (neither of which explicitly refers to trading on 
non-public information), Exchange Act Section 16(b) (requiring insiders to return to the 
issuer profits made from short-swing trading),12 the Exchange Act’s mandatory disclosure 
regime (requiring Form 10Ks, 10Qs, and 8Ks), Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
(requiring immediate public disclosure of material information given privately to analysts 
or particular traders), and Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS)(setting forth the 
basic rules of equity market structure).13 Certain provisions of state law and stock exchange 
regulations are also relevant.14 
Under this welter of provisions, some informed trades are prohibited or deterred, 
while others are allowed or in some cases even encouraged. Our analysis has both good 
news and bad news with regard to this current regulatory structure. The regulation of 
trading based on inside information, despite its tortured doctrinal basis in Rule 10b-5, has 
more policy coherence than many commentators appreciate. For example, under the 
misappropriation theory, a trade based on nonpublic information possessed by an entity 
other than the issuer is legal if the entity has given the trader permission, but is, in general, 
illegal if permission has not been granted.15 This distinction is criticized on both the left 
and the right because the counterparty to the trade has the same regrets whether permission 
was granted or not.16 Our analysis suggests that the real injury is reduced liquidity, which 
is the same in either case. The legal distinction still makes sense, however, because trades 
without permission undermine the incentives to acquire information that makes share 
prices more accurate, whereas trades with permission enhance these incentives. In contrast, 
New York’s Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, has recently utilized New York’s 
Martin Act to launch a heated, but we believe misguided, public campaign against 
institutions that release market-moving information early to a subset of traders, attacking 
what he calls “Insider Trading 2.0.”17 
Also, under current law, a tippee’s trade based on a tip from an insider within an issuer 
is prohibited only if the tipper received a personal benefit.18 This result has been similarly 
criticized because the counterparty to the tippee’s trade is equally injured whether or not 
 
 10.  In the legal literature, Stanislav Dolgopolov’s work also views informed trading as a more general 
phenomenon relevant to securities regulators, although his focus remains on insider trading. See Stanislav 
Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Informed Trading, and Market Making: Liquidity of Securities Markets in the Zero-
Sum Game, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 11.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010). 
 12.  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2011). 
 13.  17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000). 
 14.  See infra Parts V.C, V.F. 
 15.  See infra Part V.A.1.b.ii. 
 16.  Compare Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245, 246–47 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(arguing to uphold petitioner’s Rule 10b-5 conviction “even if he had obtained the blessing of his employer’s 
principals”), with United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 680, 689–90 (1997) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (arguing 
to reverse conviction because “in either case—disclosed misuse or authorized use . . . ‘[o]utsiders’ would still be 
trading based on nonpublic information that the average investor has no hope of obtaining”). 
 17.  See infra Part V.C. 
 18.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).  
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the tipper enjoyed a personal benefit.19 What constituted a personal benefit was at the 
center of the dispute in U.S. v. Salman,20 a tippee case recently decided by the Supreme 
Court. Again, our analysis suggests that the real social injury from the tippee’s trade is 
reduced liquidity, which is the same whether the tipper received a personal benefit or not. 
Imposing liability on at least some tippees when the tipper received no personal benefit is 
likely to chill analyst interviews, however. If trades based on information gleaned from 
analyst interviews are outside Rule 10b-5’s reach, some interviews will reveal material 
non-public information that will be traded upon. This, viewed in isolation, is as unfortunate 
as a trade based on the same information by an issuer insider. Not chilling analyst 
interviews, however, also has a benefit: such interviews allow analysts to gather and 
analyze pieces of immaterial non-public information that they can use to develop, and trade 
on, a superior analysis of the value of the issuer’s shares. The net social gain from the 
second kind of trades is arguably greater than the net social loss from the first.21 
On the other hand, we find trading based on information relevant to a stock’s value 
that was made public so recently that it is not yet fully reflected in the price, though 
perfectly legal today, reduces liquidity without any redeeming social benefit from its effect 
on price accuracy. This is because the information would be reflected in price very quickly 
even without such trading.22 Moreover, significant resources are devoted to such trading. 
Although it is probably impractical to try to make such trades illegal, they can be deterred 
through appropriate rules governing the structure of trading markets.23 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a basic understanding of how the 
equity market works and uses this to show the general effects of informed trading. Part III 
establishes our evaluative framework for assessing which kinds of informed trades are 
socially desirable and which are socially undesirable. For those already familiar with our 
recent work or the literature on trading markets more generally, Parts II and III may be 
unnecessary. Part IV applies the evaluative framework to four types of informed trade to 
determine which trades are socially desirable and which are not. Part V evaluates how well 
existing regulations deter the undesirable kinds of informed trades and encourage the 
desirable ones. Part VI concludes. 
II. INFORMED TRADING’S EFFECT ON LIQUIDITY AND SHARE PRICE ACCURACY 
Seeing why informed trading improves share price accuracy and decreases liquidity 
requires a basic understanding of how the equity market works.24 Accordingly, this Part 
provides a quick survey of the different types of participants, the nature of trading venues 
and the types of orders used on them, and how the market generates liquidity and the prices 
at which stocks trade. 
 
 19.  See id. at 673 (Blackmun, J. dissent) (“The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach 
does not eradicate the shareholder’s injury.”) 
 20.  Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 21.  See infra Part V.A.2.d 
 22.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 23.  See infra Part V.G. 
 24.  Portions of this Part and significant aspects of Part III infra draw extensively on treatments in our prior 
work. See Merritt B. Fox et al., The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 217–26 (2015) 
[hereinafter The New Stock Market] (discussing the three different types of private information available); Merritt 
B. Fox et al., Stock Market Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE J. REG. 67 (2018).  
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A. Market Participants and Their Reasons for Trading 
There are four basic types of traders relevant to our analysis here: informed traders, 
uninformed traders, noise traders, and anti-noise traders. The market also includes 
professional suppliers of liquidity, who buy and sell securities to facilitate other traders’ 
transactions. 
1. Informed Traders 
Informed traders buy or sell a stock based on private information providing them with 
a superior estimate of a stock’s value25 than that implied by the stock’s current price. This 
information can arise from one of four sources.26 
a. Fundamental Value Information 
Fundamental value information arises from observing varied pieces of information 
that are publicly available or involve observable features of the world and analyzing this 
information in a sophisticated way that enables an assessment of a stock’s value superior 
to that implied by the current market price. Examples of fundamental value information 
traders are actively managed mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, and the 
professionally managed portfolios of wealthy individuals and non-profits. 
b. Announcement Information 
Announcement information is information contained in a public announcement with 
obvious implications as to an issuer’s future cash flows. It only retains its status as a basis 
of informed trading for the brief period of time between the announcement and when the 
information becomes fully reflected in price. Announcement traders profit by appreciating 
with lightning speed the import of an announcement and then trading based on it with high 
speed technology that enables their orders to rapidly reach trading venues.27 
c. Information from Inside an Issuer 
Much information held within an issuer is not yet public and reflected in price. Many 
of the cases relating to informed trading arising under Rule 10b-5 involve trades based on 
such information by corporate insiders or by their direct or indirect tippees. Such cases are 
often referred to as reflecting the “classical theory” of how an informed trader can violate 
Rule 10b-5.28 
 
 25.  I.e., the expected future cash flows to a holder of the issuer’s shares (discounted to present value). See 
RICHARD BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 80–84 (11th ed. 2013). 
 26.  This taxonomy owes much to Larry Harris’s division of informed traders into value traders and news 
traders, which inspires our fundamental value and announcement traders. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 194. While 
we do not go as far as Harris to treat insider trading as a form of news or announcement trading, we share the 
general view that their contribution to the social good of informative prices are similarly low. Id. at 228. 
 27.  See Grace Xing Hu et al., Early Peek Advantage: Efficient Price Discovery With Tiered Information 
Disclosure, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 399 (2017) (documenting the existence of traders who profit due to rapidly trading 
on the release of market-moving information). 
 28.  See infra Part V.A.1.b.i. 
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d. Information from Inside a Non-issuer Source 
Information relevant to predicting an issuer’s future cash flows, which is not yet 
public and reflected in price, is also frequently held within an institution other than the 
issuer. This could be a company contemplating a takeover of the issuer, or one of the 
potential acquirer’s agents that is pledged to keep the takeover confidential, such as its law 
firm or investment bank. Alternatively, it could instead be an institutional investor planning 
the purchase or sale of a substantial number of shares. Or it could be a brokerage, research, 
or media company that finds it commercially profitable to gather bits of publicly available 
information, analyze them in a sophisticated way, and thereafter to sell and/or publicly 
announce its conclusions. Rule 10b-5 cases involving trades by insiders of such non-issuer 
institutions done without permission, or by their direct or indirect tippees, are often referred 
to as reflecting the misappropriation theory of how an informed trader can violate Rule 
10b-5.29 
2. Uninformed Traders 
Uninformed traders trade stock without possessing information that allows a more 
accurate appraisal of the stock’s value than that implied by current market prices and 
without a belief that they have such information or that prices are otherwise incorrect. 
There are many possible motivations for uninformed trading. For instance, the purchase, 
and later sale, of a share may be motivated by an individual’s desire to save, i.e., to defer 
consumption from the period of the purchase until the period of the later sale.30 The 
expected return when purchasing will simply be the expected return on the market as a 
whole adjusted to reflect the risk characteristics of the particular firm’s shares.31 Another 
motivation for an uninformed trade is to adjust for the fact that, perhaps due to changing 
conditions, the trader’s current portfolio differs from the portfolio that would optimally 
balance expected return against risk for her.32 
3. Noise and Anti-noise Traders 
A noise trader believes she has information providing her with a more accurate 
appraisal of a stock’s value than what is reflected in the current price. What distinguishes 
her from a fundamental value trader is that she in fact does not: her information is either 
already reflected in the price or is irrelevant to it. Sometimes the beliefs driving each noise 
trader during a given period will be idiosyncratic, in which case their buy and sell trades 
will tend to cancel each other out. At other times, their beliefs may be part of a shared fad 
or fashion, which will result in their trades pushing a stock’s price in the direction suggested 
by the fad or fashion. Their trading thus moves a stock’s price away from being the best 
estimate of its value in light of all currently available information. 
An anti-noise trader actively searches for new information about an issuer’s future 
cash flows. When his search suggests there is no new information about an issuer, but the 
 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Facilitating such consumption deferral is one of the social functions that a well-functioning securities 
market can provide. See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
 31.  BREALEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 302–08, 689. 
 32.  Facilitating adjustments for risk related reasons is another social function that a well-functioning 
securities market can provide. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
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price of its stock moves, the anti-noise trader will seek to profit by trading in the opposite 
direction. The trades of such an anti-noise traders will thus, to one extent or another, 
counteract the noise traders’ effect on price and thus make prices more accurate than they 
otherwise would be. Because of the obvious synergies between the information generation 
needed to engage in fundamental value informed and the information search that is the 
basis of anti-noise trading, the same person or institution will often engage in both 
fundamental value informed trading and anti-noise trading. 
4. Professional Liquidity Suppliers 
A professional liquidity supplier’s business is to stand ready to buy or sell shares at 
its quoted prices (respectively a “bid” price to buy and an “offer” or “ask” price to sell). 
For a given stock, the best available bid in the market is referred to as the national best bid 
(NBB) and the best available offer as the national best offer (NBO). Today, liquidity 
suppliers are typically high-frequency traders (HFTs).33 HFTs employ high speed 
communications to continuously update their information concerning transactions and 
quotes at every trading venue and revise their own quotes accordingly. Professional 
liquidity suppliers are typically not “informed” in the sense of fundamental value traders.34 
Indeed, because of their distinctive intermediary role facilitating trades as “market 
makers,” we will not refer to them as a “traders.” 
B. Trading Venues and Orders 
Any given stock is potentially traded on each of a number of competing venues. Each 
venue is typically an electronic limit order book, which consists of a “book” or queue of 
limit orders posted by liquidity suppliers or traders. A limit order is a firm commitment, 
binding until canceled, to buy or sell up to a specified number of shares at a quoted price. 
The venue’s computerized matching engine matches these posted limit orders with 
incoming buy and sell market orders, which are orders directed to transact immediately 
and unconditionally at whatever is the best available price in the market. 
C. Informed Trading and the Economics of Liquidity Provision 
This Part explains why every type of informed trading reduces liquidity, while at the 
same time improves price accuracy by moving prices so as to reflect relevant new 
information. We will first consider a world with just informed traders, uninformed traders, 
and liquidity suppliers. Then we will add in noise and anti-noise traders. 
1. The Liquidity Supply Business 
A liquidity supplier makes money, if on average, it sells a stock for more than it 
 
 33.  See Jonathan A. Brogaard et al., High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 
2267 (2013) (finding based on NASDAQ data set that HFTs supply liquidity for over 40% of all trades and 
provide the market quotes 40% of the time); see generally Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading and the 
New-Market Makers, 16 J. FIN. MRKTS. 712 (2013). 
 34.  The limited exception is that HFTs may seek to protect themselves from announcement traders by trying 
to monitor announcements relevant to the stocks in which they make a market. 
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purchased it.35 This might seem easy since a liquidity supplier’s offer (the quote at which 
it is willing to sell a stock) is always higher than its bid (the quote at which it is willing to 
buy the same stock). The problem, however, is that some traders are informed. Because the 
stock market is anonymous, a liquidity supplier generally does not know the identity of her 
counterparty or what, if anything, that person knows. Thus, liquidity suppliers sometimes 
trade with the informed. As we will now explain, liquidity suppliers lose money when they 
trade with informed traders. 
2. Transacting with Informed Versus Uninformed Traders 
The essential reason liquidity suppliers lose money when trading with the informed is 
that informed traders only trade when they have a superior assessment of a stock’s value 
than what the current market price implies. Thus, all traders who trade with informed 
traders lose money. The informed trader only buys when her superior assessment of a 
stock’s value suggests that the value is above the counterparty’s offer, and only sells when 
her superior assessment suggests that the value is below the liquidity provider’s bid. Thus, 
in transactions with an informed trader, the liquidity supplier sells at prices that the 
informed trader’s information suggests is below the value of the stock, and buys at prices 
that the informed trader’s information suggests is above the value of the stock. These, on 
average, will be losing transactions for the liquidity supplier. In essence, the liquidity 
supplier faces a classic adverse selection situation.36 
On the other hand, the liquidity supplier makes money from its transactions with 
uninformed traders. On average, these transactions should be profitable because the 
assessment of value of the stock implied by current market prices is the mid-point between 
the NBO and NBB. Thus, when a liquidity supplier buys from an uninformed trader at the 
NBB, and sells to an uninformed trader at the NBO, each of these transactions on average 
yields an expected profit equal to half the spread between the two quotes. Thus, the 
liquidity supplier on average buys for a little less than value and sells for a little more than 
value. 
To sum up, liquidity suppliers lose money when they buy at the bid from informed 
sellers or sell at the offer to informed buyers. They can still break even, however, as long 
as there are enough uninformed traders willing, in order to accomplish their reasons for 
trading, to suffer the expected trading loss of buying at the offer and selling at the bid. Put 
otherwise, the spread between the bid and offer must be sufficiently large that the liquidity 
supplier’s profits from trading with uninformed traders offset its losses from trading with 
 
 35.  As used here, “makes money” means that the revenues that it generates from its sales at the offer exceed 
its expenditures from its purchases at the bid. A more complete model of how the bid-ask spread is set would 
include a consideration of the costs of operations, compensation for the utility decreasing risks to its principals of 
having a not fully diversified portfolio concentrated in particular securities, and the need for capital, all features 
of the real world. Breaking even in the long run requires a spread wide enough to cover these costs as well and to 
provide a normal market return on capital. There is in fact empirical evidence that the adverse selection factors 
being discussed here account for a majority of the spread between the bid and the ask in most markets. See 
HARRIS, supra note 1, at 158. 
 36.  See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (analyzing how informational asymmetries can drive declines in the quality 
of goods traded in a market until only “lemons” are left). Liquidity suppliers face the constant threat that they are 
trading under conditions of information asymmetry and are thus transacting when the trade is adverse to their 
interests. 
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informed traders. 
3. The Liquidity Impact of an Anticipated Level of Informed Trading 
A liquidity supplier cannot simply set an extremely wide spread to garner large profits. 
Liquidity suppliers function in a competitive market. As a result, to survive, they must set 
their quotes aggressively enough (offers low enough and bids high enough offers) to attract 
counterparties to trade, but still earn sufficient revenue that their profits from trading with 
the uninformed equal or exceed their losses from trading with the informed. If the level of 
expected informed trading increases, liquidity suppliers must set their offers higher, and 
bids lower, to break even. 
This is true at the level of every bid and offer a liquidity supplier posts. The liquidity 
supplier knows there is some probability that every incoming order that transacts against 
its quotes is uninformed as well as a probability that it is informed. It also knows with 
certitude that if the next marketable order to arrive is a buy, that it may be motivated by 
private information that his offer is too low and no chance it is motivated by private 
information his offer is too high (and vice versa with sell orders). Thus, a rational liquidity 
supplier anticipates that whichever kind of order arrives next will alter its estimate of the 
stock’s value due to this informational signal—up if the order is a buy because there is 
some chance that order arrived from an informed trader, and thus, that there is positive 
information not reflected in price, and down if it is a sell, for the same reason. 
Of course, the liquidity supplier sets its bid and offer before knowing whether the next 
order will be a buy or sell. Nonetheless, when deciding on its offer, it knows that an 
informed trader will only submit a buy order to transact with that offer if in possession of 
positive private information suggesting the current price is too low. The liquidity supplier 
thus knows the arrival of a buy order will move its estimate of the stock’s value upward 
due to the probability that the order was motivated by positive private information. To not 
regret that transaction, the liquidity supplier must, before the order arrives, set its offer 
quote to reflect that upward revision accompanying the buy order’s arrival. Likewise, when 
the supplier sets its bid, to be regret free, the bid must reflect the anticipated downward 
revision accompanying the arrival of a sell order. The result is that bids and offers are 
already set at prices contingent on the next arriving order being, respectively, a buy order 
or a sell order.  If a liquidity supplier expects a higher percentage of incoming orders to be 
informed, then these revisions of estimated value (upward or downward depending on 
which kind of order arrives next) will be greater. In other words, its offers will be higher 
above the midpoint and its bid lower than the midpoint.37 
As a result, the more informed trading that liquidity suppliers anticipate, the less liquid 
the market. Liquidity is a complex concept addressing the ease of trade, which includes the 
size of a trade, the price at which it executes, and the time execution takes.  Generally, the 
larger a trade, and the faster the desired execution, the less attractive the price. The greater 
a market’s liquidity, however, the less severe are these tradeoffs. If liquidity suppliers 
expect that a higher percentage of orders will be informed, their best bids will need to be 
lower and their best offers higher. Otherwise, they will not survive in business and will not 
 
 37.  See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market 
with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985) (modeling trading behavior under 
information asymmetries in securities markets). 
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be making quotes in a rational, profit-maximizing way given the implications of whether 
the next order is a buy or sell. The same is true of its bids and offers away from its best bid 
and offer and their associated quantities, and so its book will have less depth. 
4. The Pattern of Transaction Prices in the Presence of Informed Trading 
How rational liquidity suppliers set their quotes in a market with informed traders 
produces an important side-effect. As just described, liquidity suppliers constantly update 
quotes in response to transactions.  As a result, the market price eventually comes to fully 
reflect informed traders’ information.  In essence, liquidity providers’ quoting behavior 
reflects a kind of “invisible hand” simply due to their efforts to minimize losses to informed 
traders. 
To illustrate, consider an informed trader with a piece of positive private information 
that motivates him to send in buy orders. At the same time, uninformed traders are also 
trading, and the number of their buy and sell orders are approximately equal because the 
reasons they trade are unrelated to efforts to accrue trading profits by finding over- or 
under-priced securities. So, during this period, both buy and sell orders will arrive at trading 
venues, but in total there will be more buys than sells because the incoming buy orders also 
include orders from informed traders. Accordingly, the bids and offers liquidity suppliers 
set fluctuate as their estimate of value moves slightly up and down with the arrival of each 
buy and sell order. Ultimately, though, the predominance of buy orders will cause the 
revised quotes to trend up, along with the mid-point between the bid and offer, until the 
offer gets high enough that it equals the informed traders’ estimate of the share’s value.38 
These adverse selection models are strongly supported by empirical analyses, which show 
that intra-day changes in quotes and transaction prices respond to the pattern of buy and 
sell orders, and that the adjustment in price described above often occurs rapidly.39 
In sum, informed trading makes stock prices more accurate. As described above, 
liquidity suppliers’ quotes—the prices posted on trading venues—adjust in response to 
private information. Because private information allows for a more accurate appraisal of 
the stock’s value than that implied by its current price, the effect of liquidity suppliers’ 
revisions is to cause the bid and offer to move in the direction of a more accurate appraisal 
until they fully reflect all the private information on which others trade.40 
5. Adding in the Effects of Noise Traders and Anti-Noise Traders 
Noise traders believe they have information that permits a more accurate appraisal of 
an issuer’s value, but that information either is already reflected in price or is irrelevant to 
 
 38.  More accurately, the price will be within half of the bid-ask spread from fully reflecting the information.  
 39.  See Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread, 21 
J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1988); Kalok Chan et al., The Intraday Behavior of Bid-Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks and 
CBOE Options, 30 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 329 (1995).  
 40.  This discussion leaves out what Professors Gilson and Kraakman refer to as “derivatively informed 
traders.” See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 572 (1984). These price decoders are active speculative traders who have no private information allowing a 
better prediction of the future cash flows of an issuer. Instead, they observe trends in bids, offers, and executed 
transactions to try to detect informed trading by others and seek to profit by trading in the same direction. Price 
decoders simply amplify the effects on the market of any particular kind of informed trading, whether socially 
good or bad. 
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developing a more accurate appraisal. To the extent that what drives noise traders at any 
one moment of time is idiosyncratic to each trader, their buy and sell trades tend to cancel 
each other out. Just like uninformed trading, such idiosyncratic noise trading creates no 
significant order imbalance for liquidity suppliers, and thus, has no significant effect on 
price or the bid/ask spread. To the extent, however, that a widely shared but foundationless 
belief drives the noise trading, an order imbalance will result. The imbalance pushes bids 
and offers in the direction suggested by the fad or fashion and makes the midpoint deviate 
from what would otherwise be the best estimate of an issuer’s future cash flow, given all 
publicly available information. 
Anti-noise traders actively search for new information about an issuer’s future cash 
flows. They transact when they infer the presence of noise trading because prices have 
moved, but they see no new information to justify this movement. To illustrate how the 
anti-noise trader’s reaction to fad-driven noise trading works, start with a situation where 
there is no informed trading and no noise in an issuer’s shares so that the initial midpoint 
between the bid and the offer represents the best estimate of the stock’s value given 
available information. Noise traders then acquire a widely shared but false belief that the 
stock’s value is significantly below this initial midpoint and start selling, which creates an 
imbalance of sell orders reaching the liquidity suppliers and pushes down the bid and the 
offer. They continue this selling until the bid drops to what they (incorrectly) believe to be 
the stock’s value. The anti-noise traders, observing this price drop and finding no genuinely 
predictive negative information to justify it, start buying. This creates an imbalance of buy 
orders reaching the liquidity suppliers and pushes up the bid and the offer. They continue 
this selling until the offer reaches the initial midpoint. 
As this story illustrates, noise traders who incorrectly believe they possess negative 
information suffer trading losses because they sell shares for less than they are worth. Anti-
noise traders enjoy trading gains because they buy shares for less than they are worth. In 
the end, liquidity suppliers on average just make the spread on each share purchased from 
the noise traders and then sold to the anti-noise traders. This is because the midpoint 
between the bid and the offer is commensurably below the value of the shares, both as the 
shares are purchased from the noise traders and as they are sold to the anti-noise traders, 
but the purchases are at the bid and the sales at the offer. Thus, the combination of fad-
driven noise trading and anti-noise trading does not worsen the liquidity suppliers’ adverse 
selection problem. The mirror image of this story occurs when the noise traders incorrectly 
believe they have positive information, and again, the liquidity suppliers’ adverse selection 
problem is not worsened. 
III. THE EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Evaluating whether a given kind of informed trading is socially desirable requires 
reference to the basic functions served by equity trading markets. It also requires 
recognition that other market participants adjust their behavior in response to the extent of 
this trading. Thus, the central normative question is how the existence of any type of 
informed trading affects the entire trading system in terms of its ultimate capacity to further 
the multiple goals that society expects the stock market to serve. These goals also justify 
regulation when the markets fall short. 
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A. Goals 
Five basic social goals animate most discussion of secondary equity markets41 and 
their regulation: (1) promoting the efficient allocation of capital to the best new investment 
projects in the economy; (2) promoting the efficient operation of the economy’s existing 
productive capacity; (3) promoting the efficient allocation of resources between current 
and future periods so as to best satisfy the needs of firms seeking financing for real 
investments, and the needs of savers seeking to forgo current consumption in order to enjoy 
future consumption; (4) promoting the efficient allocation among investors of the risks 
associated with holding securities so that risk-averse investors bear their volatility with 
minimal disutility; and (5) operating fairly and fostering an overall sense of fairness. In 
addition, any intelligent discussion of the desirability of any given type of informed trading 
and its regulation must take into account the impact of the trading on the real resources that 
society devotes to trading in and operating equity markets, and to the enforcement and 
compliance costs associated with their regulation. 
B. Market Attributes that Impact These Goals 
A given trading practice, including any type of informed trading, impacts these five 
broad social goals through its effect on how the trading market functions. How well the 
market functions can be described largely in terms of its two most important characteristics: 
price accuracy and liquidity.42 As a result, the social impact of any given type of informed 
trading is best evaluated through a two-step process; first assessing the effect of that trading 
on each of these two market attributes and then identifying those attributes’ effects on each 
of the five goals. As we have seen in Part I, every type of informed trading has a positive 
impact on price accuracy and a negative impact on liquidity. But, the ratio of these two 
impacts and the duration of the price accuracy improvement vary greatly from one type to 
another. Consequently, some types of informed trading are socially desirable and others 
are socially undesirable, the subject of Part III. Before turning to this analysis, however, it 
is worth briefly considering what price accuracy and liquidity are and how they affect the 
five social goals above. 
1. Price Accuracy 
Price accuracy concerns how well the trading price of an issuer’s shares predicts its 
future cash flows. Accurate secondary market prices have a number of desirable effects. 
First, the market price largely determines the price of a new offering by a public issuer and 
thus helps steer society’s scarce capital to the economy’s most promising new real 
investment projects.43 Share price also influences, with similar effect, the availability of 
new project funding from other outside sources and the willingness of managers to use 
 
 41.  In the primary market, stocks are purchased from the company issuing those stocks, while in the 
secondary market, traders buy and sell stocks from each other. Stock exchanges are fundamentally secondary 
markets. 
 42.  THIERRY FOUCAULT ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 31 (2013) 
(describing price accuracy and liquidity as the two most important attributes of a securities market and the social 
role that each plays).  
 43.  See, e.g., Qi Chen et al., Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price, 20 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 619 (2007) (showing that investment decisions tend to increase when a stock’s price has just risen). 
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internal funds for investment.44 
More accurate share prices also help reveal to corporate boards and shareholders those 
managers who are performing poorly in deploying internal funds for new investment 
projects (again promoting the efficient allocation of capital), and in directing the use of the 
issuer’s current assets (assisting the efficient operation of the economy’s existing 
productive capacity).45 They improve as well the effectiveness of share-price-based 
compensation schemes and the threats of hostile takeovers and activist hedge fund 
pressures as incentives for better managerial decision-making in these regards.46 
More accurate share prices today also likely lead over time to a greater investor sense 
of fairness because they will experience fewer large negative surprises.47 
2. Liquidity 
Liquidity is a multi-dimensional concept that involves the size of a trade, the price at 
which it is executed, and the time execution takes, with the spread between the NBB and 
NBO and the depth of liquidity suppliers’ books being good measures.48 Liquidity has an 
impact on a number of social goals: 
a. More Efficient Allocation of Resources over Time 
The prospect of greater liquidity promotes more efficient allocation of society’s 
currently available scarce resources so that they result in the most efficient pattern of 
consumption across time.  
Consider first an enterprise issuing new stock to obtain funds for a real investment 
project. It seeks to purchase current dollars in return for the promise of future dollars in the 
form of dividends or other distributions. The more liquid are an issuer’s shares, the more 
valuable its shares are to hold for any given level of expected future cash flow. Thus, when 
issuers offer shares in the primary market, shares anticipated to be more liquid will obtain, 
all else equal, a higher sale price. Hence, the lower will be the issuer’s cost of capital.49 
On the other side of this transaction are savers, who seek a future return in exchange 
for providing current savings. Illiquidity, like a tax, results in a “wedge” between the value 
 
 44.  Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 260–64 (2009). 
 45.  Id. at 258–60.  
 46.  Id. Extensive empirical evidence suggests that accurate price signals have efficiency-enhancing effects 
on managerial decisions, see FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 42, at 361–68 (collecting relevant empirical studies). 
See generally Philip Bond et al., The Real Effects of Financial Markets, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 339 (2012). 
 47.  In an efficient market, the market price, whether it is relatively accurate or inaccurate, is an unbiased 
predictor of an issuer’s future cash flows. An inaccurate price is just more likely to be far off, one way or the 
other, from how things ultimately turn out. When a large negative surprise materializes, however, its salience 
likely generates a sense of grievance even though, ex ante, a large positive surprise was as likely. See, e.g., 
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK 11 (2016) (discussing how emotions drive investing 
decisions). 
 48.  See supra Part II.C. 
 49.  The prospect of a smaller bid/ask spread means the same issuer’s expected future cash flows will be 
discounted to present value at a lower discount rate, reducing that issuer’s cost of capital.  See generally Yakov 
Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223 (1986) [hereinafter 
Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing] (showing returns on NYSE stock increase with their bid-ask spreads); 
Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity and Asset Prices: Financial Management Implications, 17 FIN. 
MGMT. 5 (1988) (studying techniques to balance benefits and costs of increasing liquidity). 
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of what the savers expect to receive in the future and the value of what the entrepreneurs 
or issuers expect to give up in the future.50 This wedge prevents certain transactions from 
occurring that would have occurred if the shares were expected to be more liquid. These 
are transactions into which the issuer and savers would have willingly entered and that 
would have made both parties better off on an expected basis. Improved liquidity reduces 
these lost gains and hence increases social welfare.51 
b. More Efficient Allocation of Risk 
Liquidity also promotes the efficient allocation of risk. For every investor, there is an 
optimal portfolio specifying what proportion of her wealth should be invested in risky 
securities and, within that part of the portfolio, what percentage should be invested in each 
available risky security. For a variety of reasons, what constitutes an investor’s optimal 
portfolio frequently changes. By reducing the transaction costs associated with transacting, 
greater liquidity allows individual investors to cost-effectively adjust their portfolios over 
time to keep it closer to what is optimal. 
c. Greater Share Price Accuracy 
Liquidity also lowers the transaction costs associated with speculative trading based 
on acquiring fundamental value information. As a result, liquidity promotes such activities 
and thus increases share price accuracy with its attendant benefits. 
IV. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF INFORMED TRADING 
As demonstrated in Part I, all informed trading increases price accuracy, which is 
socially good, and decreases liquidity, which is socially bad. How do these effects net out 
with respect to particular types of informed trading, however? This Part considers this 
question with respect to four types of informed trading. Fundamental value informed 
trading is found to be socially desirable. Announcement trading is found to be undesirable. 
Trading on the basis of information from inside an issuer is found to be generally 
undesirable, but with exceptions—for example, trading on the basis of an evaluation of the 
company based on a variety of small bits of nonpublic information as opposed to being 
based on one major piece of information about to be announced. The desirability of trading 
based on information from inside a non-issuer institution depends on whether the 
institution agrees to its use. Where it does, allowing such trading further incentivizes the 
institution to generate valuable information and, hence, is socially desirable. Where the 
institution does not agree, the opposite is the case. 
A. Fundamental Value Informed Trading 
Fundamental value information arises from a person gathering bits of publicly 
available information and observations of the world and analyzing what the person has 
 
 50.  See FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 42, at 361–68 (analyzing how illiquidity functions as a wedge 
separating transaction prices from assets’ fundamental values). 
 51.  In other words, savers save less, and entrepreneurs and issuers engage in less real investment than the 
levels that would be mutually more advantageous but for the savers’ concerns about the liquidity of the issuers’ 
shares. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 214–15. 
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gathered or observed in a sophisticated way that allows a superior assessment of these cash 
flows than is implied by current market pricing. Hedge funds and actively managed mutual 
funds, pension funds, and endowments of non-profits are examples of informed traders 
using such information. 
In determining the social value of such trading, we start with an analysis of its wealth 
impacts, from both an ex-post and ex-ante perspective. The ex-post perspective relates to 
who is better off, and who is worse off, after a single such informed trade. The ex-ante 
perspective relates to the effect on the expected wealth positions of the different market 
participants when such trading occurs as an ongoing practice within a competitive 
environment. These analyses allow us to make determinations about the fairness of the 
practice and the incentives that it creates. We consider as well the extent and duration of 
price accuracy improvement associated with the practice relative to its negative impact on 
liquidity, and the resources its practitioners consume that would otherwise be available for 
other socially useful purposes. 
Our ultimate conclusion is that fundamental value informed trading is fair and 
enhances the efficiency of the U.S. economy. Thus, it is socially desirable. The conclusion 
is not really very controversial: few have suggested that those who, through their own hard 
work and using publicly available sources, come up with superior assessments of an 
issuer’s share value should be prohibited from trading on this information to their profit.52 
The way we come to this conclusion, however, sharpens the analysis considerably and 
provides a roadmap for analyzing the other, more controversial forms of informed trading. 
1. Wealth Effects: The Ex-Post Perspective Through an Example 
Understanding the wealth transfer implications of fundamental value informed trading 
is most easily understood by starting with an example. Suppose X does substantial research, 
gathering various bits of publicly available information about the potential sales for 
automobiles operating on pure ethanol obtained from switchgrass and about the economic 
practicality of this process. ABC is known to be the auto firm furthest along in developing 
an engine that can burn this fuel. X concludes that the switchgrass process is more practical, 
and consumer interest greater, than is generally believed. ABC’s NBB is $59.95 and NBO 
was $60.05 and X’s research suggests the stock is worth $70.00. X starts using a large 
number of small market buy orders, averaging in aggregate 10,000 shares per day. For 
expository simplicity, assume that during X’s buying period, X is the only informed trader 
of any kind, there is no noise or anti-noise trading, and there is no publicly released 
information relevant to the value of ABC’s share. So if X had not been buying, the NBB 
and NBO would have remained at about their initial levels. 
 
 52.  A number of commentators have called for a “parity of information” approach to regulating insider 
trading, whereby all trades where one party is better informed would be illegal because of the unfairness imposed 
on other party. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic 
Information, 73 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1090 (1985); see generally Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty Free Insider 
Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369 (2013); Louis Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by 
Corporate “Insiders” in the United States, 3 MOD. L. REV. 34 (1970); Schotland, supra note 2. Some have also 
suggested that this is the predominant approach in Europe. See 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES 
FRAUD § 6:131 (2d ed. 1997) (describing “parity of information” as the “foundation” of E.U. insider trading 
laws). While the logic of this approach easily extends to trades based on private fundamental value information, 
these commentators, if pressed would probably not view their comments as applying to such trades. For a 
discussion of the actual European approach, see also infra Part V.D.1. 
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X continues his buying until, given the continued imbalance of buy orders over sell 
orders received by liquidity suppliers, the NBB has risen to $69.90 and the NBO to $70.00.  
By this point X has been buying for 100 trading days and has acquired 1,000,000 ABC 
shares at an average price of $65.05. At this point, X gives his research to a prominent 
business journalist, who checks it out and writes an article in a widely-read business 
magazine based on X’s research, at which point ABC’s NBB inches up to $69.95 and NBO 
to $70.05.53 Who gained and who lost in this story? 
a. Informed Traders 
X, the informed trader appears to have a trading gain of slightly less than $5 million, 
the difference between the average purchase price and what he can sell them for after the 
announcement. Since trading is a zero-sum game, the gains and losses of all the other 
players in the market must aggregate to a loss of the same amount. 
b. Liquidity Suppliers 
The liquidity suppliers would, over the 100 trading day period, have received and 
executed against their quotes 1,000,000 more buy orders than sell orders: X would have 
submitted 1,000,000 buy orders and no sell orders; the uninformed traders, because they 
trade for reasons unrelated to making trading profits, would in aggregate have submitted 
an approximately equal number of buy and sell orders.54 Thus, the liquidity suppliers 
would be short by 1,000,000 shares at the time the announcement of the engine 
development is made. 
The liquidity supplier makes on average $.05 (half the spread) for each purchase from, 
and for each sale to, an uninformed trader, but that would have happened anyway even if 
X had not traded. So, as a result of X’s purchases, the liquidity traders sold, for an average 
of $65.05, 1,000,000 shares that are now implicitly valued by the market at $70.00, i.e., the 
liquidity traders’ short positions translate into a loss equal to the same approximate $5 
million gain enjoyed by X.55 
 
 53.  This example has the informed trader ultimately making public the information she generated in order 
to lock in her profit. This not a necessary step for profiting from informed trading, however. The informed trader 
instead might wait to sell until the event predicted by the information occurs or the prospect of it occurring 
becomes obvious to the public based on other news.  
 54.  See infra Part II.C.4. 
 55.  Adverse selection models of liquidity supply of the kind described in supra. Part II.C do not address 
how liquidity suppliers reverse the inventory effects of executing on the order imbalance caused by informed 
trade, nor the price impact when informed traders lock in their profits by reverse transactions once their private 
information becomes public. In terms of the account in the text, the simplest story is as follows. By the time of 
that the information becomes public, X’s portfolio has about a million ABC shares more than a fully diversified 
portfolio and the portfolios of the liquidity supplier, relative to fully diversified ones, in aggregate are short about 
1,000,000 shares short in ABC shares. In each case, this position means that the portfolio has a large amount of 
extra, firm specific, risk that can be eliminated by full diversification without any sacrifice in expected return. See 
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 302–08, 689. This is something they would wish to do. Thus, X would be 
anxious to sell, and the liquidity suppliers would be anxious to buy, this amount of shares and the transactions to 
accomplish this should occur at about $70.00 per share. To the extent that the sales by X nevertheless began to 
push the bid down much below this figure, anti-noise traders, believing there is no private information, would 
submit buy orders.   
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c. Uninformed Traders 
Because the uninformed buy and sell orders each day are essentially equal in number, 
the gradual increase in the bid and offer during the period of X’s trading will be a wash for 
uninformed traders as a group. Compared to if X had not placed his orders, however, sellers 
are better off and buyers are worse off, with the gains for sellers just equaling the losses of 
buyers. 
2. Wealth and Resource Allocation Effects: The Ex-ante Perspective 
The ex-ante perspective compares, in long run competitive equilibrium, a world where 
the practice of fundamental value informed trading occurs freely versus one where it does 
not and considers the differences in terms of the wealth positions of the market’s various 
participants and in terms of the allocation of resources. It assumes, not unrealistically, that 
all the participants have unbiased (though not necessarily accurate) expectations 
concerning the prevalence of informed trading by fundamental informed traders. 
a. Fundamental Value Informed Traders 
Fundamental value informed trading will generate positive trading profits on an 
expected basis, as illustrated above, even though the existence of the practice widens the 
spreads that its practitioners incur. The business of such trading requires skilled and 
unskilled labor and physical, organizational, and financial assets.56 
In a competitive economy, suppliers of the ordinary inputs will be paid a market return 
comparable to what they would earn if the resources they supplied were deployed instead 
another way. So, the practice of fundamental value informed trading has no effect on their 
 
  A more complicated story would recognize that liquidity suppliers would likely seek to rebalance their 
portfolios regularly and would not wait until the informed trading stopped.  Using the example again, one could 
imagine that after each day’s 10,000 share order imbalance, liquidity suppliers would have a somewhat lower bid 
and higher offer than what would be called for by the pure adverse selection considerations described in supra 
Part II.C. The object would be to find some price sensitive investors who would respond by sending in more sell 
orders and fewer buy orders than would otherwise have been the case. These investors are different from any of 
the market participants described in supra Part II.A. Each of these investors has its own reservation price for 
buying and for selling ABC shares that is a product of its own best estimate of ABC’s future cash flows based on 
its particular analysis of publicly available information, how long or short it already is in ABC shares, and a 
discount to reflect the chance that what appears to be an attractive purchase or sale price might be the result of 
informed trading. See MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE: THEORY, PRACTICE AND 
POLICY, 34–43, 55–57 (1988) [hereinafter FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE]. Inventory models in 
microstructure economics have developed a sophisticated literature in this vein. See, e.g., Mark 
B. Garman, Market Microstructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 257, 265 (1976); Thomas S.Y. Ho & Hans R. 
Stoll, Optimal Dealer Pricing Under Transactions and Return Uncertainty, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 47 (1981); Hans R. 
Stoll, The Supply of Dealer Services in Securities Markets, 33 J. Fin. 1133 (1978); Amihud & Mendelson, Asset 
Pricing, supra note 49, at 223–24. Because these trades are not motivated by either new private information, like 
those of fundamental value informed traders, or on a search suggesting that a price change is not due to new 
private information, like those of anti-noise traders, they otherwise act more like uninformed traders and are thus 
not considered as an additional kind of trader in the analysis in the text. 
 56.  Some of these inputs are ordinary in the sense that they could equally usefully be deployed elsewhere 
in the economy. Other inputs are specialized, specifically the efforts of key persons who possess abilities and 
skills uniquely useful for generating new fundamental value information. All of these inputs will be drawn into 
this business up to the point where, at the margin, the expected trading profits from successfully generating and 
trading on fundamental value information equals the costs of paying for the inputs.  
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wealth positions. The persons with uniquely useful abilities and skills for fundamental 
value trading will be paid greater rents than they would be paid if they had to work in a 
different business. So, the wealth positions of these persons are greater in the world where 
the practice occurs freely than where it is prohibited. 
b. Liquidity Suppliers 
As shown in Part II, liquidity suppliers will incur expected trading losses when they 
transact with informed traders. At the same time, liquidity suppliers gain in their 
transactions with uninformed traders, making on average half the spread with each 
purchase or sale. To survive in a competitive market, a liquidity supplier must set its bids 
and offers so that these losses and gains balance out, plus cover the returns paid to its 
personnel, a market return on the capital needed for real estate and equipment and for 
engaging in the trading itself, and compensation for the undiversified nature of the portfolio 
that the business will be holding much of the time. With spreads wider than this, the 
liquidity supplier will not attract orders. With spreads narrower than this, at least some of 
the liquidity supplier’s inputs will be receiving less than a market return and thus the 
supplier will not be able to survive in the long run.57 
Despite the fact that the trading losses suffered by liquidity suppliers because of the 
free occurrence of fundamental value informed trading are passed onto traders in the form 
of wider spreads, the practice does have a negative effect on the wealth positions of certain 
persons associated with the liquidity supply business. This is because the practice widens 
the spread between bid and offer, thereby increasing the cost of trading. When trading costs 
more, less of it occurs. This means that there is less demand for the services of liquidity 
suppliers.58 
c. Anti-noise Traders 
Anti-noise traders buy at the offer and sell at the bid. To the extent that fundamental 
value informed trading widens the spread, it increases the anti-noise traders’ costs of doing 
business, making it less profitable.  This decreases the resources drawn into it, thereby 
reducing the rents paid to its specialized inputs. These points are softened, though, by the 
fact that there are synergies for a person or entity to engage in the fundamental value 
informed trade business and the anti-noise trading business at the same time. 
d. Uninformed Traders: Actual Costs and Their Ultimate Incidence 
Because an uninformed trader buys at the offer and sells at the bid, she pays the spread 
between the two in the full cycle of the purchase and sale of a share. Freely occurring 
 
 57.  Recall that in Part II we adopted a simplified analysis that abstracts away from all the costs of being a 
liquidity supplier except the “adverse selection” component of the spread, i.e., the portion of the spread by which 
trading gains from transacting with uninformed investors compensate for the trading losses from transacting with 
informed traders. See Glosten & Harris, supra note 39.   
 58.  Like fundamental value informed trading, liquidity supply requires both ordinary and specialized 
inputs. Lower demand will mean less of both of these kinds of resources will be pulled into the business. Again, 
suppliers of the ordinary inputs will earn the same ordinary market return whatever the level of liquidity supply 
activity, and so their wealth positions are unaffected. Persons with abilities and skills uniquely useful for liquidity 
supply will be paid less in rents and so their wealth positions would be negatively affected. 
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fundamental value trading makes this spread larger and so this cost of trading will be 
greater for her. However, determining the ultimate incidence of this cost on the wealth of 
the market participants involved is complicated. When an issuer’s entrepreneurs and early 
investors engage in an initial public offering, the shares offered will be discounted to reflect 
the anticipated spread paid with each subsequent sale and purchase in the secondary 
market.59 The wider spread from freely occurring fundamental value informed trading 
reduces what the entrepreneurs and early investors receive selling shares when they take 
their firms public. This discount continues at the same level for as long as the firm appears 
to have a long run future. 
e. Uninformed Traders: Illusory Losses and Gains 
A number of other uninformed trader losses and gains appear to be associated with 
fundamental value informed trading, but, upon closer analysis, prove to be illusory. An 
uninformed seller may sometimes regret a sale that occurs at a time when, unknown to her, 
an informed trader is making purchases. But, because the uninformed trader’s motivations 
for trading are not prompted by either new information or price change, she would have 
sold anyway even if the informed trader had not traded. So, the regret is not properly related 
to the informed trader’s purchases. 
Indeed, as the example above illustrates, the informed trader’s purchases, by pushing 
up the bids and offers quoted by liquidity suppliers, mean that the uninformed seller will 
receive more for her shares than if the informed trader had not been purchasing. From an 
ex-ante point of view, however, this gain is also illusory: the uninformed trader was just as 
likely to be a buyer as a seller when the price has been pushed up in this way and so the 
practice on an ongoing basis is as likely to hurt her as help her. A parallel set of illusions 
would accompany an uninformed trader’s purchase when an informed trader is selling. 
3. Fairness Analysis 
Overall, it is hard to argue that fundamental value informed trading creates unfairness.  
Liquidity suppliers will suffer trading losses, as illustrated in the ex-post example. The ex-
ante analysis, however, shows these losses simply to be a cost of doing business that is 
passed onto traders through wider spreads. The ex-post example shows that uninformed 
traders trading in the same direction as the informed trader are worse off. For example, 
when an informed trader is buying, he pushes prices up, thereby increasing what 
uninformed buyers need to pay. But, the informed trading makes uninformed traders 
trading in the opposite direction (in this example, the sellers) better off by an equal amount. 
So, the practice is as likely to help as hurt an uninformed trader as she enters into any given 
transaction. Given this, a loss in any one transaction is likely to be canceled out by a gain 
in some other transaction, particularly if the investor ameliorates this risk, along with the 
myriad of other risks in equity investing, by holding a diversified portfolio. 
Freely occurring fundamental value informed trading does widen the spread that 
 
 59.  The idea that shares’ trading prices are discounted based on anticipated costs of trade has now been 
familiar for decades. For early examples from the insider trading context, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider 
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 325 
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Insider Trading]; Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure, and 
Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 807–09 (1980). 
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uninformed traders need to pay. However, this widened spread, as we have seen, neither 
helps nor hurts uninformed traders on average because share prices are commensurately 
discounted to reflect this widened spread. Thus, the cost of this widened spread ultimately 
falls on entrepreneurs and early investors that face a higher cost of capital because of this 
discount. These same entrepreneurs and early investors benefit, however, from the 
practice’s resulting improved price accuracy, which, as we will discuss, lowers the cost of 
capital. 
The ex-ante analysis shows that freely allowing fundamental value trading draws 
resources into this business, thereby improving the wealth positions of the suppliers of its 
specialized inputs.And it diminishes resources drawn into the liquidity supply and anti-
noise trading businesses, thereby decreasing the wealth positions of their specialized input 
suppliers. In a market economy, however, the offer of rents prompt the suppliers of 
specialized inputs to come forward and is the mechanism by which these resources get 
directed to the activity for which they are most particularly suited. Thus, the practice’s 
positive or negative effects on the rents being paid in these three businesses do not appear 
to raise any greater fairness issues than do the rents paid by persons with special abilities 
and skills across the whole market-based part of our economy.60   
4. Efficiency Considerations 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the more serious normative question raised by 
fundamental value informed trading is whether the practice increases or decreases 
economic efficiency, not whether those who suffer losses as a result of such a trade have 
experienced unfairness. Indeed, because the analysis of the wealth impacts of the other 
three types of informed traders will follow lines similar to the analysis here, we will 
conclude that with them also, efficiency, not fairness, should be the prime normative 
concern. 
Freely occurring fundamental value trading positively affects economic welfare by 
increasing share price accuracy. It negatively affects economic welfare by reducing 
liquidity and by consuming resources that would otherwise be available for the production 
of other goods and services of value to society. We discuss these effects and their balance 
below. 
a. Positive Effects on Price Accuracy 
Trading by any type of informed trader moves prices in the direction of what they 
would be if the trader’s information was fully reflected in price. As a consequence, all 
kinds of informed trading make prices more accurate.61 The distinguishing feature of 
fundamental value informed trading is that, unlike the other three kinds of informed 
trading, the information on which it is based did not exist before it was generated as the 
 
 60.  Nonetheless, there is an active and notable debate as to whether the size of the financial intermediation 
industry is excessive and whether wages are being competitively set within it. See generally Thomas Philippon, 
Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1408 (2015) (assessing the efficiency 
dynamics of financial services over time); Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the 
U.S. Financial Industry: 1909–2006, 127 Q. J. ECON. (2012). 
 61.  Informed trading by definition is based on information that allows a more accurate appraisal of the 
stock’s value than the assessment of value of the stock implied by current market prices. So, when prices move 
in the direction of reflecting this information, they become more accurate. 
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result of the trader’s own actions. This distinguishing feature has two important 
implications discussed immediately below. These implications, in turn, suggest that, 
relative to other types of informed trading, fundamental informed trading’s effect on price 
accuracy has a much larger positive impact on the functioning of the real economy and its 
capacity to provide society with goods and services. 
i. Trading Profits Create Incentives to Produce New Information 
With fundamental value informed trading, the prospect of trading profits creates an 
incentive to increase the stock of information in the world relevant to predicting an issuer’s 
long-term future cash flows. This is not the case with the other three kinds of informed 
trading. 
ii. Price Accuracy is Improved Over a Longer Span of Time 
Price accuracy relates to the accuracy with which the market price of an issuer’s shares 
predicts the events that determine an issuer’s future cash flows. Compared to the 
information that is the basis of other types of informed trading, the information motivating 
fundamental value informed trading is more likely to relate to the probability of an event 
in the medium or long-term future. 
To illustrate, consider the ex-post example above. X does substantial research, 
gathering various bits of publicly available information about the potential sales for 
automobiles operating on pure ethanol obtained from switchgrass and on the practicality 
of the process. Using smart analysis, he concludes that they are better than generally 
believed. He therefore purchases shares of ABC, the auto company known to be furthest 
along in developing an engine that can burn this fuel.62 
Now consider the timing relating to the types of nonpublic information that are more 
typically the basis of the three other types of informed trading. One such type of 
information relates to an event that has already occurred and had an effect on the cash 
position of the issuer available to shareholders. An example would be knowledge of a 
defalcation that leaves the corporate treasury $100 million short of what is publicly 
believed to be the case. Another such type of information relates to an event that has already 
occurred and that will have a definite effect on future cash flows. An example would be 
knowledge of a yet to be announced FDA approval of a new patented drug for which there 
should be large demand. Yet, another relates to an event that is very likely to occur in the 
near future and, if it does, will have a definite effect on future cash flows, but the facts 
suggesting this high likelihood are not yet public—for example, facts suggesting a high 
likelihood of such FDA approval very soon. 
iii. Consequences for the Extent of Positive Impact on Economic Welfare 
Keep in mind these two implications associated with fundamental value informed 
trading—its incentive effects and its capacity to improve price accuracy for a long period 
of time—and consider how the world would differ with and without the practice. Compare 
this difference with how the world would differ with and without each of the other three 
kinds of informed trading. For each of the four types of informed trading, if the particular 
 
 62.  See supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
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type were effectively banned, the accuracy of the price at some later point in time will 
become as accurate of a predictor of an issuer’s cash flow as it would have been earlier if 
the particular type of trading had been allowed. The question is how much earlier would 
this price accuracy improvement have come if this type of informed trading had been 
allowed.63 If fundamental value informed trading were allowed, this price accuracy 
improvement would often have come considerably earlier. For most informed trades of the 
other three types, the price accuracy improvement would have come only slightly earlier 
because the information would have been publicly announced and fully reflected in price 
very soon. In essence, freely occurring fundamental value informed trading tends to make 
share prices consistently more accurate—information with predictive value is created and 
the resulting improvement in the accuracy with which the price predicts the cash flow 
involved is considerably earlier than otherwise relative to when the cash flow is realized.64 
This assessment suggests that the positive effects on price accuracy from fundamental 
value informed trading result in a greater contribution to social welfare than the 
contribution from the free occurrence of the other three kinds. To see why, recall that more 
accurate prices benefit the economy by helping to allocate the economy’s scarce capital to 
the most promising potential real investment projects and by improving the utilization of 
the economy’s existing productive capacity through optimizing the signals provided to 
management about investment decisions and the signals given to boards and shareholders 
about the quality of management decisions.65 Informed trades, based on information that 
will be fully reflected in price soon after the trade occurs, do little to help share prices 
perform this kind of guiding work in the real economy. Conversely, informed trades that 
are based on information that would not otherwise have been created and that improve 
price accuracy well in advance of the cash flows they are predicting do help prices perform 
this guiding kind of work. Put another way, efficient allocation of capital and good 
corporate governance depend much more on how much information is reflected in price, 
not on slight improvements in the timing of price accuracy improvements. What is 
important about informative prices is that they impound information into prices at time 
intervals relevant to the important decisions being made by actors in the real economy. 
Important capital raising, takeover, and investment decisions tend to be made over the 
course of many months and are unlikely to be affected by an improvement in price accuracy 
for the short period between an informed trade and the information on which it was based 
being disclosed in a company’s regular course of business.66 
b. Comparison of Benefits with Costs 
The social gains from freely occurring fundamental value informed trading must be 
compared with the social losses. Freely occurring fundamental value informed trading 
 
 63.  For a model that gives an important role to the lead time with which a price change better predicts a 
subsequent cash flow, see Kenneth D. West, Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatility, 56 ECONOMETRICA 
37 (1988).   
 64.  See Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 344–48 (2003) (elaborating on the concept of informed prices). 
 65.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 66.  See Schotland, supra note 2, at 1443 (citing studies); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Tapping the Brakes: Are Less 
Active Market Safer and Better for the Economy?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 4–9 (2014), 
https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/Documents/news/conferences/2014/fmc/Stiglitz.pdf. 
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increases illiquidity, which reduces social welfare because of the resulting misallocation of 
resources over time and of risk.67 And, it draws resources into the business of fundamental 
value informed trading that could be used elsewhere in the economy to produce other useful 
goods and services.68 
In our view, fundamental value informed trading’s price-accuracy-increase-induced 
improvements in the real economy—better capital allocation and better utilization of the 
economy’s existing productive capacity—outweigh the social losses associated with such 
trading. In essence, the decision to allow fundamental value informed trading is a decision 
to encourage the production of the information on which such trading is based with the 
knowledge that the result will be a higher spread paid by uninformed traders, the incidence 
of which is ultimately borne by entrepreneurs and investors prior to a firm becoming 
publicly traded. Although our conclusion involves some speculation, fundamental value 
information would probably be under produced from a social welfare point of view absent 
this subsidy. Empirical evidence suggests that a substantial portion of the information that 
is reflected in the share prices of public companies is the result of fundamental value 
informed trading.69 There is also ample empirical evidence to suggest that accurate price 
signals do in fact have efficiency-enhancing effects on managerial decisions, both in terms 
of new investment decisions and the utilization of existing productive capacity.70 Theory 
suggests that the many imperfections in the market for the development of knowledge mean 
that the information reflected in share prices would be underprovided if fundamental value 
informed trading were prohibited: in essence such knowledge has the qualities of a public 
good.71 
 
 67.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 68.  It also reduces the resources going into the businesses of liquidity supply and price sensitive 
fundamental trading and, thus, to the level of the socially valuable services they perform. There is no obvious 
reason to believe these services would not be operating at their socially optimal levels absent the informed trading. 
Finally, it draws resources into price decoding, thereby magnifying both the benefits and costs of the fundamental 
value informed trading. 
 69.  See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L ECON. 
REV. 1 (1969). 
 70.  See FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 42, at 361–68 (collecting relevant empirical studies); see, e.g., Philip 
Bond et al., supra note 46; Artyom Durnev et al., Does More Firm Specific Stock Price Variation Mean More or 
Less Informed Pricing?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 797 (2003); Artyom Durnev et al., Value Enhancing Capital Budgeting 
and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation, 59 J. FIN. 65 (2004); Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the 
Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (2000). 
 71.  See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS (1962) (analyzing information as a 
public good that we should expect to be under-produced). We know that capital constraints means that someone 
who develops new information often cannot fully exploit its trading value through her own trading.  And 
imperfections in the market for information mean she may well not be able to fully exploit the remaining trading 
value by selling the information.  Thus the full trading value of the information in the circumstances that we 
identify (advancing substantially in time when the information gets incorporated in price) may be less than the 
benefit to the real economy that arises from the improvement in price accuracy resulting from the trades and so 
such information is likely to be under produced.  Put another way, price accuracy is valuable in ways that does 
not go into the calculus of analysts, and so the value of price accuracy to the real economy involves a positive 
externality and will be under produced. But see J. Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and 
the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971) (arguing that due to potentially duplicative 
information-generating activities, information could be over-produced, especially because the first to obtain that 
information can often obtain a speculative advantage). 
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B. Announcement Information 
Announcement information is information contained in an announcement by an issuer 
or other institution with direct implications as to the issuer’s future cash flows.72 This 
information remains announcement information only for the brief period of time between 
when the announcement is made and when the information becomes fully reflected in price. 
Success in announcement trading is based on a capacity to act with great speed.73 Often 
this involves both a capacity to machine read whether a public announcement has positive 
or negative implications for the issuer involved (doing so far faster than a human being 
can), combined with a very fast capacity to send buy or sell orders to the relevant trading 
venues. 
1. Wealth Transfers and Fairness 
The ex-post and ex-ante wealth transfer implications of announcement informed 
trading are essentially identical to those of fundamental value informed trading, just 
substituting announcement trading wherever fundamental value informed trading appears 
in the discussion above. Accordingly, freely occurring announcement trading results in 
more resources than otherwise being drawn into this business and hence increases the rents 
paid to the suppliers of its specialized inputs. Because liquidity suppliers protect 
themselves against such trading with wider spreads, it increases the cost of trading and 
hence lessens demand for their services and reduces the rents paid to their suppliers of 
specialized inputs. The wider spreads also make all trading, including all informed trading 
more expensive. In essence, this is a crowding out effect, which reduces the rents paid to 
the suppliers of their respective specialized inputs. As was discussed earlier, such effects 
on the rents paid to the suppliers of specialized inputs needed by the various market 
participants do not raise serious fairness issues.74 
Uninformed traders are on average neither advantaged nor disadvantaged by 
announcement trading. Again, because uninformed traders’ decisions are not motivated by 
either information or price, they are as likely buyers as sellers if they happen to trade during 
the brief moment before the announcement is fully reflected in price and thus are as likely 
to be benefitted as harmed by an announcement trade’s price impact. Announcement 
trading will widen the bid-ask spread but share prices are discounted to reflect the extent 
to which it does so.75 The cost of this increased spread again ultimately falls on 
entrepreneurs and early investors, who face a higher cost of capital because of this 
discount.76 
In sum, the conclusion is the same as with fundamental value informed trading: rather 
than fairness, the more important normative question concerning announcement trading 
concerns its efficiency effects. 
 
 72.  See generally Hu et al., supra note 27 (studying rapid trading and stock price adjustment in response to 
the release of market-moving information). 
 73.  See id. (documenting prices fully adjusting to information in less than 20 milliseconds). 
 74.  See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 75.  Supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 76.  Supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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2. Efficiency Considerations 
In our view, announcement trading is socially undesirable. Its capacity to augment the 
speed with which market prices reflect already existing new information is of socially 
insignificant benefit. The ways by which price accuracy improves the efficiency of the real 
economy do not require anything like this speed.77 Moreover, announcement trading’s 
negative social effects are substantial. Announcement trading has all the same negative 
efficiency effects from its adverse impact on liquidity as does any other type of informed 
trading. In addition, it consumes scarce resources—talented people and sophisticated 
equipment—that could be usefully employed elsewhere to provide goods and services of 
value to society. Its crowding out effect reduces the level of fundamental value informed 
trading, which is a socially desirable activity.78  
C. Inside Information: The Issuer as Source 
Issuer inside information is information not yet publicly available that is obtained 
from within the issuer and is relevant to predicting the future cash flows paid to the holders 
of the issuer’s shares. Few topics have divided law and economics scholarship as deeply 
as informed trading by issuer insiders. There is vociferous disagreement not only 
concerning the justification for prohibiting such insider trading, but whether a prohibition 
should exist at all. 
For the first 30 years after the beginnings of federal securities regulation, there was a 
widely shared perception on behalf of commentators that such insider trading was unfair 
because it gave corporate insiders unique opportunities to capture the wealth generated by 
corporations, a view still frequently expressed in judicial opinions and by some prominent 
commentators.79 A sea change was triggered by Henry Manne’s 1966 publication of 
“Insider Trading and the Stock Market.”80 Manne insisted that not only is such insider 
trading not unfair, but that it is actually socially beneficial because it enhances efficiency, 
and thus should be legal. Trading by issuer insiders enhances efficiency, in his view, 
because it results in the speedier incorporation of information into stock prices and because 
it serves as an effective form of compensation for corporate managers.81 
In this section, we examine both the fairness and efficiency implications of issuer 
insider informed trading. We will conclude that it is indeed not unfair, although public 
 
 77.  See supra Part IV.A.4. 
 78.  See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 79.  See Friese v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 558, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (classifying insider trading 
as “a manifestation of undue greed among the already well-to-do, worthy of legislative intervention if for no other 
reason than to send a message of censure on behalf of the American people.”). For scholars focused on 
understanding insider trading through a fairness lens, see generally John A. C. Hetherington, Insider Trading and 
the Logic of the Law, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 720 (1967); Homer Kripke, Manne’s Insider Trading Thesis and Other 
Failures of Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945 (1985); Schotland, supra note 2; Seligman, supra note 52; 
Green & Schmid, supra note 52; Loss, supra note 52. 
 80.  MANNE, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 94–95. 
 81.  Id. at 80; Henry Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1966, at 114. See 
also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2 and accompanying text. Other critics of the prohibition of insider trading 
have provided a public choice analysis of insider trading regulation as essentially “purchased” by market 
professionals from regulators. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private 
Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987) [hereinafter 
Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand]. 
846 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 43:4 
perceptions to the contrary may still provide some justification for its prohibition. But we 
will also conclude, contrary to Manne, that it makes the economy less, not more, efficient, 
although this argument weakens and may, in fact, reverse itself in the case of trades based 
on some forms of immaterial information—the accumulation of many small bits of 
information that are not likely to be reflected in price for some time. 
Some of the analysis that follows here simply collects and briefly summarizes aspects 
of the large scholarly literature addressing insider trading written over the last few decades.  
In doing so, we cannot hope to touch on all of insightful work in this area.  Rather, we seek 
to put in context our own particular contributions.  Among other things, as will be 
illustrated in Part V, we believe that our approach enables us to offer sharper analysis of 
the tipper and tippee trading issues that only last year occupied the Supreme Court and will 
likely preoccupy lower courts for years to come. 
1. Wealth Transfers: Their Incentive and Fairness Effects 
Understanding the wealth transfer implications of trading based on issuer inside 
information is again most easily understood by starting with an example and seeing the ex-
post effect of the trade, and then considering, from an ex-ante perspective, what the impact 
of the practice is as a generally known ongoing phenomenon. Much of this analysis 
parallels our analysis of fundamental value informed trading and announcement trading 
and will not need to be repeated here, but there are enough differences that it is worthwhile 
starting with a new example for the ex-post analysis. 
a. Ex-post Perspective 
Suppose Y obtains from within EDF Inc. information, not known publicly or 
otherwise reflected in price, that EDF is developing a new low-pollution engine that is 
likely to pass the last few tests being held over the next two weeks. If, as expected within 
EDF, the engine does pass the tests, EDF will be able to enter into some very profitable 
contracts that will significantly improve the future cash flow paid out to holders of EDF 
shares compared to what is currently expected. Y uses a large number of orders, averaging 
in aggregate 10,000 per trading day, to purchase 100,000 EDF shares over the ten trading 
days in the two-week period. Prior to his purchases, EDF’s NBB was $59.95 and NBO was 
$60.05. For expository simplicity, assume that during this period Y is the only informed 
trader of any kind and there is no publicly released information relevant to the value of 
EDF’s shares. So if Y had not made these purchases, the NBB and NBO would have 
remained at or close to these levels throughout the two-week period. Instead, at the end of 
two weeks, EDF’s NBB is $62.95 and NBO is $63.05, with Y having paid an average of 
$61.55 for each of his shares. The engine passes the tests, and at the end of the two-week 
period, EDF announces the development at which time the price jumps such that the NBB 
is 79.95 and NBO is $80.05. 
From the point of view of trading gains and losses, the analysis of who is helped and 
who is hurt as a result of Y’s purchases during these two weeks is identical to the example 
of X’s trading in ABC shares used in the ex post analysis of fundamental value informed 
trading, except that it is concentrated over two weeks instead of stretched over five 
months.82 The same is true of the analysis as to why the NBB and NBO each increased as 
 
 82.  See supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
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a result of the informed purchases.83 Y appears to have a trading gain in the neighborhood 
of $1.85 million. Since trading is a zero-sum game, the gains and losses of all the other 
players in the market must aggregate to a loss of the same amount.84 The liquidity suppliers 
would receive, and have executed against their quotes, 100,000 more buy orders than sell 
orders and thus would be short by 100,000 shares at the time the announcement of the 
engine development is made. As a result of Y’s purchases, the liquidity suppliers sold, for 
an average of $61.55, 100,000 shares that are now valued by the market at $80.00, i.e., the 
liquidity traders’ short positions translate into a loss equal to the same approximate $1.85 
million gain enjoyed by Y. For the uninformed traders as a group, the increase of $3.00 
over time in the bid and offer is a wash, with sellers as a group being better off than if Y 
had not placed its orders, and buyers being equally worse off. 
b. Ex-ante Perspective 
Now consider the ex-ante wealth effects of freely occurring issuer insider trading in 
longer run competitive equilibrium, assuming again, not unrealistically, that all the players 
have unbiased (though not necessarily accurate) expectations concerning the prevalence of 
issuer insider informed trading. 
i. Issuer Insiders 
In a world with freely occurring issuer insider trading, an insider, as a result of her 
employment, gains the opportunity to obtain, and trade on, pieces of nonpublic 
information. In a competitive market for managerial talent, the expected value of this 
perquisite will reduce commensurately the aggregate value of the other components of her 
compensation package relative to a world without issuer insider trading. In either world, in 
equilibrium, the insider will receive a compensation package with the same total expected 
value and the shareholders will ultimately pay for this package. Thus, once again, the real 
normative question concerning the desirability of this type of informed trading relates to 
the efficiency of this kind of compensation, not to its fairness. 
Having said this, it should be noted that the managerial labor market appears to be 
very sticky.85 So a regulatory change that would allow an increase in the level of such 
trading would, for some period of time, enrich managers who have access to nonpublic 
issuer information. A regulatory change that would decrease the level would have the 
opposite effect. 
ii. Liquidity Suppliers  
The analysis for liquidity suppliers directly parallels the analysis for them with regard 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 82.  
 85.  Compare LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing that executive compensation is excessive because 
managers control boards and compensation contracts are not negotiated at arm’s length), with Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984) 
(arguing that executive contracting reflects the result of an efficient contracting process). Even assuming, as we 
do, that competitive pressures in the managerial labor market will in the long run force this full reduction in other 
forms of compensation, such an assumption is not inconsistent with believing that such wage adaptation may 
occur quite slowly.  
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to fundamental value informed trading and announcement trading: freely occurring issuer 
insider informed trading will lead them to quote a wider bid/ask spread than if the practice 
were effectively prohibited.86 Cross-country empirical studies suggest that this difference 
in the width of the spread would be substantial. One study examined the 103 countries with 
stock markets (in 2002) and found that laws against insider trading existed in 87 of them, 
with 38 of those countries having made a prosecution under their laws.87 There was a 
significant reduction in firms’ cost of capital, presumably reflecting greater share 
liquidity88 when a country enacted and first enforced a prohibition against insider trading.89 
Freely occurring issuer insider trading, by widening the spread and hence increasing the 
cost of trading, would reduce the amount of liquidity supply demanded.  Fewer resources 
being drawn into the liquidity supply business would reduce the rents paid to the suppliers 
of its specialized inputs. 
iii. Uninformed Traders 
The more significant conclusion, but one that flows from the identical analysis in the 
cases of fundamental value informed trading and announcement trading, is that uninformed 
traders are on average neither directly advantaged nor disadvantaged by the free occurrence 
of issuer insider informed trading. This again is because share prices are discounted to 
reflect the extent to which such trading increases the bid-ask spread, with the cost of this 
increased spread ultimately falling on entrepreneurs and early investors that face a higher 
cost of capital because of this discount.90 
It is worth noting again, given the much more heated debate concerning this kind of 
informed trading, the illusory nature of some other losses and gains that some might say 
are experienced by uninformed traders. The typical uninformed seller in our example 
would likely regret her sale because, but for her sale of shares at some point during the two 
weeks of Y’s purchases at an average price of $61.45 shares,91 she would have been 
holding stock that could instead be sold for $79.95. Y’s purchase, however, did not cause 
her to miss out on this jump in price, because she would have sold whether Y had traded 
or not.92 So, her regret is not properly related to Y’s purchases. Indeed, the average 
uninformed seller’s price of $61.45 is $1.50 higher than it would have been but for Y’s 
purchases. From an ex-ante point of view, however, this average $1.50 gain is as illusory 
as the regret, because the uninformed trader is just as likely to be a buyer as a seller when 
the price has been pushed up in this way. 
 
 86.  See Parts IV.A.4, IV.B.2. 
 87.  Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 104 (2002) 
(stating that 38 countries included a majority of developed countries). 
 88.  See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
 89.  Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 87, at 78. 
 90.  See Part IV.A.2.d. 
 91.  In the example, Y purchased at the offer for an average price of $61.55, which implies that the average 
sale at the bid by uninformed sellers would have been at $61.45.   
 92.  In contrast, the price sensitive fundamental trader has a reasonable claim that but for the insider’s 
purchase, he would not have sold and would instead be holding shares that could be sold for about $18.50 more, 
because his sale was prompted by the rise in EDF’s share price resulting from Y’s purchases. 
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iv. Fundamental Value Informed and Anti-noise Traders 
Freely occurring issuer insider trading’s widened bid-ask spread will increase the cost 
of business for fundamental value informed traders and anti-noise traders and thus will 
reduce the level of such forms of trading, in essence crowding them out,93 and reduce the 
resources going into these businesses and the rents paid to the suppliers of its specialized 
inputs.94 The negative effect on the amount of information reflected in share prices can be 
serious: cross-country studies demonstrate a significant positive relationship between the 
effectiveness of a country’s prohibition on issuer insider trading and a measure of the 
amount of information reflected in the share prices of its issuers.95 
2. Efficiency Effects: Claimed Social Benefits 
The claimed positive efficiency effects of freely occurring issuer insider trading relate 
to price accuracy and its desirability as a form of managerial compensation. 
a. Price Accuracy Effects 
Trading by informed issuer insiders, like all informed trading, moves price in the 
direction of what it would be if the information on which they are trading was fully 
reflected in price. Thus, in this narrow sense, such trading makes prices more accurate. 
There is a serious question, however, as to whether it actually accelerates the reflection of 
already existing information in price. Even if it does, it generally advances the moment by 
which information gets reflected in price by very little, which renders the social gain, if 
any, insignificant. 
i. Delaying Versus Accelerating Issuer Disclosure 
Freely occurring issuer insider trading may, in many cases, actually delay, not 
accelerate, the moment existing information gets reflected in share prices.96 Insiders would 
have an incentive to cause the issuer to delay disclosure of the information on which they 
are trading in order to maximize the profitability of their trades by slowly buying large 
amounts of stock.97 While these trades will move price in the right direction, typically only 
 
 93.  See infra Part IV.D. See also Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Haggerty, Insider Trading and the 
Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106, 110 (1992); Stiglitz, supra note 66. This is the fundamental 
argument of the seminal piece. Goshen, supra note 2, at 123843.  
 94.  For a political economy explanation of SEC insider trading enforced prompted by fundamental value 
informed traders and liquidity suppliers seeking to protect profits, see Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, 
supra note 82. 
 95.  Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical 
Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 27577 (2007) (finding that 
cross-nationally more rigorous insider trading laws are associated with more accurate stock prices and greater 
liquidity). 
 96.  See, e.g., Easterbrook, Insider Trading, supra note 59, at 333. 
 97.  For empirical evidence that various indirect methods of insider trading can negatively affect the quality 
of issuer disclosure, see Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading Via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 83133 
(2014) (disclosures in advance of issuer share repurchases where managers own issuer stock); Robert M. Daines 
et al., Right on Schedule: CEO Option Grants and Opportunism (Jan. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2363148 (disclosures in advance of upcoming scheduled 
option grants based on the current share price). 
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with public disclosure will the information be fully reflected in price.98 
There is a response to this argument: insider trading might actually create incentives 
for faster public disclosure because once insiders trading ceases, they want the information 
disclosed immediately and fully reflected in price. 99 The insider can then close her position 
and take her full profits as quickly as possible, thereby ending the risks associated with her 
concentrated position in the issuer’s stock.100 
ii. The Unimportance of Delay or Acceleration 
Ultimately, the question of delay versus advance is an empirical one and rigorous 
work on the issue is lacking. More fundamentally, the kind of insider trading that a 
prohibition can effectively catch and that, in the absence of prohibition would be most 
tempting, will probably be a trade shortly before an anticipated corporate announcement. 
Thus the period over which price accuracy would be improved, whether accelerated or 
delayed, is going to be brief in any case. As discussed above, when informed trading 
improves price accuracy for only a brief period of time, the improvement will not have any 
important effects on enhancing the efficiency of the real economy.101 
To explore this argument, we are assembling a novel dataset through coding SEC 
enforcement releases concerning insider trading. We inquire as to two issues. First, what 
is the time lag between when the insider traders acquire their position and when the 
information on which they trade would have otherwise become public? Second, what is the 
informational content on which they typically trade? Based on results from the year 2016, 
covering insider trading on 90 separate events, we find that the time lag between the 
insider’s initiating transaction and public disclosure of the event on which the insider traded 
ranges from one day to 101 days, with three days being the modal time lag between the 
unlawful transaction and public disclosure. The average lag is 25 days, and the median lag 
is 19 days. Interestingly, in the vast majority of enforcement actions, the information on 
which the insider trades concerns an impending acquisition. The few other pieces of 
nonpublic information involve asset acquisitions, earnings announcements, and licensing 
announcements. In other words, those insiders that the SEC actually prosecutes for illegal 
trading overwhelmingly trade on forms of information that they do not need incentives to 
carefully analyze and probe, and which would have become public soon in any event. 
b. Managerial Compensation 
A second efficiency argument for issuer insider trading, again pioneered by Henry 
Manne, is that insider informed trading can serve as a particularly effective compensation 
arrangement to induce managers in large bureaucratic corporations to act more 
entrepreneurially.102 If managers can freely profit from trading based on their knowledge 
 
 98.  See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 56869; Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market 
Prices, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1995 (describing how information is incorporated into price). Capital 
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of others trying to decode what the insiders know based on observed price changes. Sandford J. Grossman & 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980). 
 99.  Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 879 (insider trading may accelerate the speed of disclosure).  
 100.  See supra note 53. 
 101.  See supra Parts IV.A.2.a, IV.B.2. 
 102.  MANNE, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 110–20. 
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of an issuer’s future performance, they have additional incentives to achieve 
accomplishments that, when announced, will constitute the kind of good news that drives 
up the issuer’s share price. However, this argument too is open to significant rebuttals. 
i. Distorted Incentives to Choose Risk Over Expected Return 
The managerial incentives provided by insider trading may in fact be neutral. Selling 
after undertaking undisclosed actions that will drive firm performance down is just as 
profitable as buying after undisclosed actions that will drive it up. Even if these bets against 
the firm could be fully deterred by rules, such as Exchange Act section 16(c)’s prohibition 
on short selling by issuer officers and directors,103 this rebuttal is suggestive of another 
point: insider trading can incentivize managers to make the riskier decision—because of 
its bigger upside, even where the less risky choice would have a higher expected return and 
thus, would be better for shareholders and for the efficiency of the economy as a whole.104 
ii. Inefficient Allocation of Risk 
Allowing insider trading is an inherently risky form of compensation and as such 
allocates risk between managers and shareholders inefficiently.105 An issuer is a wealth 
generating entity whose residual returns, after paying for labor and other inputs, are shared 
between managers and shareholders. The returns on this wealth-generating entity are 
inherently volatile, with much of this volatility coming from firm-specific risk. The typical 
managerial compensation arrangement divides these volatile residuals up between 
managers and shareholders. At one extreme would be a straight fixed salary with no insider 
trading allowed. At the other extreme would be no salary but permission to engage in 
insider trading to the extent that the expected value of this right equals that of the straight 
salary. On an expected basis, each of these two compensation arrangements is equally 
costly to shareholders. In the first, the volatility in future residuals is fully borne by the 
shareholders. In the second, the shareholders bear only a portion of this volatility, with the 
rest being borne by the managers. 
Shareholders are the more efficient bearers of this risk.106 This is because they can 
diversify their portfolio of stock holdings and completely eliminate the firm-specific 
portion of the risk. Managers, in contrast, are already inherently undiversified, because 
 
 103.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015) (prohibiting insiders from short selling). 
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 105.  See, e.g., Easterbrook, Insider Trading, supra note 59, at 332 (comparing the risk of insider trading as 
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 106.  Cf. Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 
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they have developed substantial firm-specific human capital.107 The firm-specific portion 
of the residual volatility that they take on with the insider trading arrangement, which also 
cannot be diversified away, just adds to the problem and will cause them disutility. Thus, 
managers will be willing to agree to a package with lower expected compensation if it does 
not include a risky insider trading right component. Shareholders, because of their capacity 
to diversify, suffer no disutility from bearing this package’s extra risk. So, a package 
without an insider trading component, if it can be effectively enforced, would be the one 
that both managers and shareholders would choose. 
iii. Poorly Focused Reward for Performance and Distorted Internal Communications 
The idea of insider trading profits as an effective compensation tool also suffers from 
being unrealistic because there is generally a low correlation between who is responsible 
for the accomplishments that, when announced, will constitute good news and who might 
be able to profit from trading in anticipation of the announcement. So, for instance, the 
head of a division responsible for a major development is likely to represent only one of 
many corporate insiders who will be aware of this news prior to its public disclosure and 
able to profit by trading on it. The result is a poorly focused incentive scheme where the 
person responsible for corporate improvements will internalize only a fraction of insider 
trading profits. Even more serious, the opportunity to inside trade might result in corporate 
insiders working less effectively as a team. Those acquiring information first may, rather 
than sending it immediately to others, hold back until they can maximize their own trading 
profits without the competition of the others.108 
3. Efficiency Considerations: Social Losses 
Freely occurring issuer insider informed trading has substantial negative social 
effects. It has the same adverse impact on liquidity as does any other type of informed 
trading. As discussed, less liquidity reduces social welfare because of the resulting 
misallocation of resources over time and misallocation of risk.109 It also reduces 
significantly the level of fundamental value informed trading, which we have concluded is 
a socially desirable activity. 
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Issuer insider informed trading has an additional social cost not present with 
fundamental value informed trading and announcement informed trading. While we find 
that issuer insider informed trading is not unfair, much of the public feels that it is. This 
perception of unfairness is demoralizing: it harms people to think that a major social 
institution is corrupt. It also discourages direct and indirect ownership of equities by 
persons who, absent this perception, would find equities to be an investment vehicle that 
suits some of their needs, thereby blocking what would otherwise be welfare improving 
transactions. Normally, the better response to public misunderstanding is education. This 
perception of unfairness may be very hard to eradicate, however, and a generally effective 
prohibition on insider trading is another way of dealing with the perception’s unfortunate 
effects. 
4. Overall Policy Conclusions 
The foregoing discussion strongly suggests that freely occurring informed trading by 
issuer insiders would be socially undesirable. While the practice does not, as many believe, 
work a wealth-redistributing unfairness, it does generally lead to inefficiency. Both the 
share price accuracy and compensation efficiency social benefit arguments for allowing 
such trading are unpersuasive. And, as just recounted, its costly effects on liquidity clearly 
have a number of negative effects on efficiency, as does the widespread perception that it 
is unfair. 
Four further questions need to be addressed, however. First, is it necessary that 
informed trading by the insiders of all issuers be banned, or would this be better decided 
on an issuer by issuer basis? Second, does trading based on all inside information need to 
be banned or just trades based on material information? Third, what are the social 
consequences of trades based on tippees of issuer insiders? Finally, do the conclusions 
concerning the social undesirability of trading by issuer insiders apply as well to issuers 
themselves? 
a. Should Issuers be able to Consent to Insiders Trading? 
Nothing in this analysis so far suggests that it matters whether or not the issuer 
consents to the trading by its insiders. If the analysis above is correct, the claimed efficiency 
benefits are just as unpersuasive, and the negative efficiency effects are just as substantial, 
with or without the issuer’s consent. We cannot be sure, however, that the analysis above 
is correct as to every single issuer in the market. Thus, an argument can be made that each 
issuer should be able to adopt a policy publicly allowing its insiders to trade as long as the 
policy is publicly announced.110 Suppose our conclusion that insider trading is efficiency 
diminishing is correct with respect to a given issuer. The market will price the issuer’s 
stock lower if it nevertheless did allow insider trading. Because the entrepreneurs and 
original investors want as high a share price as possible when they take the issuer public, 
they would have strong incentives to impose a binding prohibition on insider trading in its 
shares.111 If, instead, the analysis is incorrect with respect to a given issuer, allowing 
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insider trading would result in a higher share price at the time that the issuer goes public 
and the entrepreneurs and original investors would allow for insider trading. In essence, 
the reaction of the market would force the issuer to absorb the loss if trading by its insiders 
would really be inefficient and enjoy the gain if it were efficient, and thus guide the firm 
to the most efficient choice. 
There is some force to this argument, but we are ultimately skeptical. One reason is 
that there are probably substantial scale economies in an effective enforcement mechanism 
against issuer insider informed trading.112 So, if there is good reason to believe that it is 
inefficient for most issuers, the restriction should apply to all.113 Another reason relates to 
all companies that are already publicly traded. Even if allowing issuer insider informed 
trading would be inefficient at such a firm, its managers typically own only a small portion 
of the stock. They would likely have much more to gain from being able to inside trade 
than they would lose from the decline in the value of their stock. If the managers are either 
given the power to decide the question or have a heavy influence on a shareholder vote on 
it, the firm will consent when it is socially undesirable for it to do so. 
b. Insider Trading on Small Bits of Nonpublic Information 
As discussed, the reasons for finding issuer insider informed trading to be socially 
undesirable are strongest for a trade shortly before an anticipated corporate announcement. 
This is the kind of insider trading that a prohibition can most effectively catch and that, in 
the absence of prohibition, would be most tempting. It is also the kind with the poorest 
ratio of social benefits to social costs. 
Consider, in contrast, a purchase by a corporate insider where she concludes, based 
on a myriad of individually small pieces of nonpublic information about which she is 
inevitably aware, that the issuer’s shares are worth more than the current market price. Her 
purchase will move the price in the direction of reflecting these many small pieces of 
information and thus make the price more accurate. Most of these pieces of information 
will probably never be disclosed voluntarily or pursuant to mandatory disclosure. This is 
because there are so many of them, each of which is individually of little importance. Often, 
also, disclosure would be harmful to the issuer’s ability to compete. Absent insider trading 
based on this information, it will not be reflected in price until much later when the good 
or bad results that they predict materialize. 
The complaint that allowing this type of insider trading would incentivize managers 
to take risky decisions at the expense of expected return is also inapplicable to this kind of 
insider trading. In making purchases based on such information, managers would need to 
face both the upside and downside risks since they would need to make their purchases 
well before the results of their decisions were in. 
There is considerable evidence that this kind of insider trading occurs and is 
profitable. Officers and directors are required under Exchange Act 16(a) to report all 
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purchases and sales. Presumably most officers and directors comply except for trades that 
violate Rule 10b-5. Officers and directors appear to make above market returns on their 
reported purchases and sales of their own firms’ shares that they report in their 16(a) 
filing.114 
c. Trading by Tippees 
A trade by a tippee of an issuer insider is no different in its negative effect on liquidity 
than a trade by the insider herself. Moreover, if the insider receives a benefit in return, or 
the satisfaction of making a gift to someone, allowing such tippee trading has just the same 
managerial incentive effects, good and bad, as allowing trades by the insider herself: the 
insider just gets the benefit or satisfaction instead of getting the profit from the trade. There 
are no such managerial incentive effects if the tip is not a gift and no benefit is received by 
the insider. But then the trade does not serve as an alternative form of compensation that 
can reduce the size of other components of the compensation package.  In sum, absent 
some additional considerations relevant to a particular case, informed trades by tippees are 
at least as socially undesirable as trades by insiders. 
d. Trading by an Issuer Possessing Material Information or by Persons to Whom It Gives 
the Information 
Trading by an issuer possessing material non-public information is socially 
undesirable. It has the same positive price accuracy effects and negative liquidity effects 
as trading by an issuer insider. This is a tradeoff that we concluded involves a net social 
loss. There are no obvious other efficiency benefits when it is the issuer that is trading 
instead, and so the same conclusion should apply to this trading as well. 
We also concluded that trades by direct or indirect tippees of issuer insiders are 
socially undesirable. Again, the analysis behind this conclusion applies as well to trades by 
outsiders based on such information where its provision to them for trading was authorized 
by the issuer.  
D. Inside Information: A Non-Issuer Source 
Trades can also be based on confidential information relevant to predicting an issuer’s 
future cash flows that is obtained from within an institution other than the issuer. This 
institution could be, for example, a potential acquirer of the issuer (or the potential 
acquirer’s investment bank or law firm), a hedge fund or other institutional investor, or a 
financial research company. The analysis of the social desirability of such trades largely 
tracks the analysis of the desirability of trading based on information generated within the 
issuer, in particular the wealth transfer and fairness parts of the analysis. Ultimately, 
however, we will reach a somewhat different conclusion. We found trades based on 
material information generated within the issuer to be socially undesirable no matter who 
executes them. In contrast, we find many kinds of trades based on information generated 
within a non-issuer institution to be socially desirable. This difference in conclusions 
relates to how sensitive the generation of each of the two types of information is to the 
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prospect of profits from trading on it. Specifically, most material information from within 
an issuer is the synergistic byproduct of the operations of the underlying business and thus 
will be generated whether or not the issuer or its insiders are allowed to trade on it. And, it 
will be reflected in price soon in any event. Much of the information material to an issuer 
from within a non-issuer institution, however, would not be generated unless the institution, 
or others approved by it, are allowed to trade on the information. 
1. Socially Desirable Trades 
Recall the definition of fundamental value informed trading: trading based on 
information generated by a person who gathers various bits of information that are publicly 
available or observable and analyzes them in a sophisticated way that enables a superior 
assessment of an issuer’s cash flows to that implied by the current stock price. When an 
institution other than the issuer develops confidential material information about the issuer 
that enables such a superior assessment, it is very likely to be fundamental value 
information—indeed sufficiently likely that it seems appropriate for our purposes here to 
classify all such information developed by a non-issuer institution as fundamental value 
information. Thus, in accordance with our earlier analysis, a trade by a non-issuer 
institution based on confidential material information that it has developed is socially 
desirable. It reduces liquidity with the consequent negative effects on efficiency in the same 
way that an issuer insider trade does. But, this efficiency loss is more than counterbalanced 
by the efficiency gains arising from the incentives that are created to do the hard work of 
generating price-accuracy-enhancing information and to get it reflected in price.115 
Using the same logic, where the institution allows someone else, whether an insider 
or outside person, to trade on such information, this trade is socially beneficial as well. The 
institution can be expected to try to maximize the returns it can garner from generating 
such information by authoritatively deciding to whom, if anyone, to communicate the 
information. The institution could also specify the terms of its use, including, whether it 
can traded upon by the recipient, whether it can be recommunicated one or more times, 
and, if it can be recommunicated, the terms that each recommunicating person must impose 
on her recipient. The institution presumably only authorizes such use when it calculates 
that its benefits from doing so equal or exceed any loss from its trading profits. 
This logic again applies as we contemplate the information being handed down 
through a chain of recipients. The more money the institution’s direct recipient can make 
from trading on it or communicating it to yet others, the more consideration the direct 
recipient will be willing to provide the institution originally generating the information. If 
the direct recipient is permitted by the institution’s terms to communicate the information 
to others, the direct recipient will go through the same calculations in determining its terms, 
and so on down the chain, if further communications are allowed by the originating 
institution and each prior recipient. Thus, assuming there are one or more levels of 
authorized indirect recipients, there will be a whole network of agreements and duties 
specifying who is allowed to trade and under what conditions.116 
 
 115.  See supra Part IV.A.4.b.  
 116.  These terms include, unless the institution affirmatively reverse them, obligations that arise because of 
the status of the recipient, for example the obligation of an agent of the institution such as its lawyer or investment 
bank, not to use for its own purposes confidential information received from the institution.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).  
2018] Informed Trading and Its Regulation  857 
2. Socially Undesirable Trades 
Any trading not approved by this network of agreements and duties is socially 
undesirable. Such unapproved trading reduces liquidity, with the consequent negative 
efficiency effects, to the same extent as would trading by the outside institution itself or by 
trades approved by this network. But, unlike trading by the institution or approved by this 
network, unauthorized trading creates no compensating, efficiency-enhancing incentives 
to gather and analyze price-accuracy-improving information.117 Rather, the unapproved 
inside trade has the opposite effect, reducing the profitability of the institution’s efforts to 
gather information and analyze it in a superior way. If the institution itself is planning to 
trade, the insider’s early trades make the prices at which the institution trades less 
advantageous. If instead, the institution seeks to profit from selling the information to 
someone else who will trade on it or from simply publicly announcing the information, the 
information is less valuable to the purchaser if an unapproved person has already begun to 
move price in the indicated direction by trading on it first. 
In sum, where the institution is allowed to provide confidential information to others 
to trade on or otherwise utilize, its incentives for generating such information are at least 
as great or greater than if it were the only one that could trade the information. This 
depends, however, on the system of informed trading prohibitions that prevent trades 
outside of what is authorized by the resulting network of agreements and duties. The more 
effectively the prohibitions do this, the greater are the incentives of outside institutions to 
engage in the socially desirable practice of generating share-price-accuracy enhancing 
information. 
V. LEGAL REGULATION: DETERRING UNDESIRABLE INFORMED TRADING AND 
ENCOURAGING DESIRABLE INFORMED TRADING 
The level of informed trading of various types is affected in the United States and 
elsewhere by a complex, and far from coherent, jumble of legal rules. These rules directly 
prohibit some types of informed trades and indirectly discourage or encourage others. In 
this Part, we will explore this pattern of regulatory impacts to see how close what is 
prohibited or discouraged comes to what the preceding analysis suggests are the socially 
undesirable informed trades and how close what is encouraged comes to what it suggests 
are the socially desirable ones. 
Four types of legal rules will be considered here: (1) rules that outright prohibit certain 
kinds of informed trades; (2) rules that require, under certain circumstances, the return of 
profits from the informed trader to the issuer of the shares; (3) mandatory disclosure rules; 
and (4) rules governing the structure of the markets for secondary trading. 
A. Informed Trading Prohibitions 
The most prominent U.S. prohibition of certain informed trades has emerged out of 
the courts’ and SEC’s interpretations of Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
 
 117.  The unapproved trade does improve price accuracy in the sense of getting the information that is 
generated by the institution reflected sooner in price. Like trading by an issuer insider, however, the non-issuer 
insider is most likely to trade only shortly before the outside institution itself would have transacted itself or made 
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economy in any meaningful way. See supra Part IV.A.4,  IV.B.2.   
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promulgated thereunder.118 After an exploration of the history and current reach of these 
prohibitions, we will consider, in subsequent sections, the use of New York’s Martin Act 
to stop certain informed trades and two comprehensive statutory schemes for regulating 
informed trading: the EU’s Market Abuse Directive and the proposed U.S. Insider Trading 
Prohibition Act. 
1. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: History of Development of the Current Law 
The Exchange Act is the primary statute in the United States regulating the secondary 
trading of securities. No provision of the Exchange Act, including Section 10(b), explicitly 
prohibits any kind of informed trading. Section 10(b) simply prohibits certain 
“manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s] in contravention of” rules and 
regulations prescribed by the SEC “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors.”119 The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1943 pursuant to 
Section 10(b), but that rule too contains no explicit prohibition of any type of informed 
trading. The closest it comes to doing so is to prohibit, “in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security,” employing “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” or engaging 
“in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person.”120 A brief history of the evolving interpretation of these phrases 
in the statute and the rule can help explain Rule 10b-5’s current, rather jury-rigged, set of 
prohibitions on certain types of informed trading. 
a. The Early History of the Development of the Doctrine 
It was thirty years after the passage of the Exchange Act and more than twenty years 
after Rule 10b-5’s promulgation before either the SEC or a court rendered the first opinion 
holding that Section 10(b) could be violated by some kind of informed trading on a 
secondary exchange. This opinion, by the SEC in Cady, Roberts & Co.,121 related to the 
appropriateness of a Rule 10b-5 based disciplinary action against a broker who received 
nonpublic information from a company’s director that the company was about to announce 
a dividend cut. The broker, ahead of the announcement, quickly sold the company’s shares 
for various accounts over which he had discretion.122 The source of the information—the 
director—was apparently under a reasonably based, but mistaken, belief that the news was 
already public and phoned the broker to find out the market reaction. Not reaching the 
broker, he left a message that effectively communicated the cut.123 The Commission ruled 
that a person who has a special relationship with the company and is privy to its internal 
affairs violates Rule 10b-5 if she trades in its stock without disclosing any material 
nonpublic information in her possession.124 The broker was a partner in a brokerage firm 
for which the director was a registered representative and this connection with the company 
was enough to find the needed relationship.125 Four years later, the Second Circuit, in dicta 
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in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,126 citing Cady Roberts, dispensed with the need for a 
relationship with the issuer, an interpretation that greatly expanded the range of persons 
whose informed trades would violate Rule 10b-5. The court stated “anyone in possession 
of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public or . . . must 
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside 
information remains undisclosed.”127 
b. Chiarella and Its Aftermath 
The Second Circuit’s very broad dicta in Texas Gulf Sulphur was rejected twelve years 
later by the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States, which held that “a duty to disclose 
under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.”128 
The defendant, Chiarella, learned of several yet-to-be-announced hostile tender offers from 
his work at a financial printing firm preparing the offering documents. Chiarella’s 
employment contract pledged him to keep confidential, and not to trade on, what he learned 
at work. He nevertheless purchased shares of each target and resold them for a predictably 
higher price after the offer’s announcement. The District Court found Chiarella guilty of a 
criminal violation of Rule 10b-5 and sentenced him to a year in prison, which the Second 
Circuit upheld. Chiarella appealed to the Supreme Court. 
At the Supreme Court level, each of the Supreme Court Justices in the Chiarella case 
appears to have believed that more than mere possession of material nonpublic information 
was necessary for a trader to violate Rule 10b-5. A majority, based on the narrow holding 
that mere possession was not enough, voted to reverse the Second Circuit’s affirmation of 
the convictions. The nine Justices splintered, however, on how much more than mere 
possession was needed and whether evidence of whatever more he believed was needed 
was presented to the jury. 
i. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading 
Justice Powell was joined by three other Justices in his opinion setting out the 
“classical theory” of insider trading. Under this theory, there needs to be “a relationship of 
trust and confidence between the parties to a transaction.”129 Powell stated that Chiarella 
had no such relationship with the sellers of the target companies’ securities and that “[h]e 
was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market 
transactions.”130 
ii. The Misappropriation and Structural Access Theories 
Justice Burger’s dissent set out the “misappropriation theory” of insider trading. 
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Under this theory, trading by someone not in such a relationship with his counterparty 
nevertheless violates Rule 10b-5 if he trades on material nonpublic information that he has 
“misappropriated.”131 Applying this theory, Burger believed Chiarella violated Rule 10b-
5 because the breach of his confidentiality agreement with his employer meant his trades 
were based on misappropriated information.132 Two other Justices, Stevens and Brennan, 
expressed a willingness to entertain the misappropriation theory, but joined the part of 
Justice Powell’s opinion reversing the conviction based on the narrow holding that mere 
possession while trading was not enough for a violation. They did so because they did not 
believe the misappropriation theory had been presented to the jury.133 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, set out in a separate dissent yet a third 
theory of insider trading, “structural access.” Under this theory, trading on material 
nonpublic information by someone who was neither in a relationship of trust and 
confidence with the other party, nor was trading on the information in violation of a duty 
owed to some third party, would nevertheless violate Rule 10b-5 if she obtained the 
information as the result of a “structural informational advantage.”134 
A clear majority in Chiarella believed that not only was mere possession insufficient, 
mere structural access was insufficient as well. The status of the misappropriation theory, 
however, was unclear. This uncertainty was finally resolved by the Court seventeen years 
later in the O’Hagan case.135 The defendant, O’Hagan, was a lawyer who learned of the 
confidential plans of his firm’s client to engage in a hostile tender offer and purchased the 
proposed target’s shares. O’Hagan was convicted at trial based on the misappropriation 
theory. The majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, affirmed the conviction, holding 
that a Rule 10b-5 violation “may be predicated on the misappropriation theory”136 and 
found that trading on nonpublic material information violates Rule 10b-5 where the trade 
was “in breach of a duty [of loyalty and confidentiality] owed to the source of the 
information.”137 
iii. Tipper and Tippee Liability for Information Coming from within the Issuer 
The tipper/tippee situation arises when there is trading by a person (the recipient) who 
learns material nonpublic information, directly or indirectly, from a person (the source) 
who, if she traded on it herself, would violate Rule 10b-5. Consider first the situation where 
the source is an insider of the issuer, the recipient has no connection with the issuer, and 
the source willingly, but without the issuer’s permission, provides the information to the 
recipient. The source would violate Rule 10b-5 if she herself traded in the stock because 
she would be regarded as being in a relationship of trust and confidence with the issuer’s 
shareholders.138 But it is the recipient, not the source, who is trading.  The recipient has no 
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special relationship of trust and confidence with either the persons with whom he deals or 
with the source.  So, at first blush, neither the tip by the source, nor the trade by the 
recipient, would appear to violate Rule 10b-5 under either the classical theory or the 
misappropriation theory. 
Justice Powell, in dictum in his Chiarella opinion, found an inventive way around this 
problem.  He suggested that the source, who is deemed to be in such a relationship with 
the issuer’s shareholders, breaches her duty to these shareholders by providing the 
information to someone likely to trade on it, and the recipient, by trading on it, becomes a 
“participant after the fact” in the source’s breach.139 This theory became the basis of a 
holding three years later in Dirks v. SEC, where Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
said that: 
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade 
on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing his information to the tippee and 
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.140 
In Dirks, however, Powell added an additional wrinkle that went beyond his dictum 
in Chiarella. He concluded that a breach of duty to the shareholders requires that the tipper 
“personally . . . benefit, directly or indirectly, from [her] disclosure,”141 not just that the 
transfer of information was in violation of the issuer’s determination that it be kept 
confidential. Thus, for the source to violate Rule 10b-5, she must have this personal benefit, 
and for the direct recipient to violate the Rule, he must be aware of this benefit. The 
personal benefit requirement is also met, however, when the information is a gift to a 
relative or friend.142 Justice Powell apparently added the personal benefit requirement to 
avoid chilling analyst interviews, which he regarded as socially beneficial.143 Without it, 
the source and the recipient in such an interview could each violate Rule 10b-5 when they 
mistakenly thought that the information was not material or was already public.144 
Now consider trades by more remote tippees: those who receive the information 
directly or indirectly from the direct recipient. They can violate Rule 10b-5 in either of two 
ways. One is where the trader is aware of the breach by the original source, including the 
source’s personal benefit. Such a trader is as much a participant after the fact in the breach 
by the original source of his duty to the issuer’s shareholders as would be a direct recipient 
who trades.145 The other way is where the trader has a relationship with the person 
providing him the information that imposes on the trader a duty of confidentiality. The 
trade, as a breach of the recipient’s duty to this provider, is a Rule 10b-5 violation based 
on the misappropriation theory—a violation that does not depend on his knowledge 
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concerning the original breach by the insider.146 
Recently, in Salman v. United States, the Supreme Court elaborated upon the gift 
branch of the personal benefit test in ways particularly relevant to remote tippees.147 The 
tipper and the direct tippee in this case were brothers who each pled guilty to a Rule 10b-
5 violation. There was evidence that they had a close relationship. The defendant, Salman, 
was the tipper’s brother-in-law and, as part of a close extended family, received the 
information from the direct tippee and traded upon it. Thus, he was obviously aware of the 
relationship between the tipper and direct tippee. He also knew the tipper was the origin of 
the information on which he traded. Salman argued that he had not violated Rule 10b-5, 
however, because there was no evidence that the tipper received anything of a pecuniary 
or similarly valuable nature in exchange for the information, evidence that Salman said 
was required by some of the language in the recent Second Circuit decision in U.S. v. 
Newman.148 Salman was found guilty at trial and his conviction was upheld by the Ninth 
Circuit. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the Dirks 
personal benefit test 
require[s] proof of ‘an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents 
at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,’ as the Second 
Circuit held in [Newman] . . . , or is it enough that the insider and the tippee 
shared a close family relationship, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case.149 
In its unanimous opinion, the Court cleared up some confusing language in Newman 
that appeared to eliminate altogether the gift branch of the Dirks personal benefit test.150  
Equally important, it addressed the question of what kind of evidence is sufficient for a 
jury to infer that the source received a personal benefit in the form of making a gift. It 
concluded that evidence of the existence of a close family or friendship relationship—all 
that Salman appeared to know—was by itself sufficient.151 
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iv. Tipper and Tippee Liability for Information Coming from within an Institution Other 
than the Issuer 
Now consider information that comes from within an institution other than the issuer. 
As a first hypothetical, suppose that the source owes a duty to this institution to keep the 
information confidential and not trade on it; the recipient has no relationship with either 
the institution or the source; and the source willingly, but without authority, provides the 
information to the recipient, who trades on it. The source in this hypothetical has violated 
Rule 10b-5: the breach of the confidentiality duty is a misappropriation that is in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security because the tip was provided to someone likely to 
trade on it.152 If the recipient is aware of the breach by the source, he too violates Rule 
10b-5 as a participant after the fact in the source’s breach.153 
As a second hypothetical, suppose again that the source owes a duty to the institution 
to keep the information confidential and not to trade on it, and may, or may not, be 
authorized to provide it to the recipient. The recipient, who trades on it, has no relationship 
with the institution but does have a duty of confidentiality to the source. The trade breaches 
this duty and is thus a straightforward Rule 10b-5 violation under the misappropriation 
theory. It does not matter whether or not the communication was unauthorized and, if it 
was, that the recipient was aware. More remote tippees who trade on the information or tip 
themselves may, depending on the particular circumstances, violate Rule 10b-5 based on 
various possible combinations and permutations of the participant after the fact and 
misappropriation theories as they might be applied to the persons in the chain in a way 
similar to these two hypotheticals. 
One issue remains unresolved with regard to cases where the misappropriator is not a 
trader, but a tipper. Significant disagreement exists among the Circuit Courts concerning 
whether the tipping misappropriator must receive a “personal benefit” for there to be a Rule 
10b-5 violation, as is required under Dirks for tippers from within the issuer.154 The Second 
Circuit historically did not require that a tipping misappropriator receive a personal benefit 
to violate Rule 10b-5 and, despite recent dicta going the other way, still has no holding that 
a personal benefit is required.155 The First Circuit has, in its own words, “dodged the 
 
 152.  See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 
85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011); 18 INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT and PREVENTION § 6:13 (Donald C. 
Langevoort ed. 2015). 
 153.  See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he government was simply 
required to prove a breach by Salvage, the tipper, of a duty owed to the owner of the misappropriated information, 
and defendant’s knowledge that the tipper had breached the duty.”). 
 154. See SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2000) (reviewing case law but declining to decide the 
issue). The issue arose, but was not decided by the Supreme Court, in Salman. The case appears to involve only 
information coming from investment banks the clients of which were not the issuers of the shares that were traded. 
Thus the alleged Rule 10b-5 violation would need to be grounded on the misappropriation theory (although the 
government maintained it was grounded on the classical theory as well). Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425 n.2. The Court 
says “we need not resolve the question [of whether the personal benefit test applies to the misappropriation 
theory]”, because the parties “do not dispute” that it applies, and so “we will proceed on the assumption that it 
does.” Id.   
 155.  SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The 
misappropriation theory of liability does not require a showing of a benefit to the tipper.”) Also, in U.S. v. 
Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit focused on whether a marital relationship by itself 
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question.”156 The Eleventh Circuit has held that a personal benefit is required in 
misappropriation cases.157 As discussed below in our evaluation of Rule 10b-5’s informed 
trading prohibitions, we believe that imposing this added test is doctrinally unnecessary 
and leaves a large number of socially undesirable trades beyond Rule 10b-5’s 
prohibitions.158 
v. Informed Trading by an Issuer 
The prevailing view in the lower courts is that issuers themselves are prohibited under 
Rule 10b-5 from trading in their shares based on their own nonpublic material information. 
The leading case is Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp.,159 where the court said “Courts, 
including this one, have treated a corporation trading in its own securities as an ‘insider’ 
for purposes of the ‘disclose or abstain’ rule.”160 As discussed earlier, such a prohibition 
is good policy.161 The Supreme Court, however, has never addressed this question and the 
prohibition is difficult to justify in terms of the Court’s doctrinal foundations in this area. 
It certainly could not be justified under the misappropriation theory and it does not fit easily 
under the classical theory either. It is a stretch under corporate law to say that the 
corporation itself, as opposed to its insiders, owes fiduciary-like duties to its 
shareholders.162 
 
created a duty of confidentiality which is breached when the recipient of the information uses it to tip, and made 
no mention that the recipient needed as well a personal benefit in return for the tip. In a later opinion, the Second 
Circuit affirmatively suggested that Chestman supported the notion that the personal benefit was not required for 
misappropriation case. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 156.  United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 15 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 157.  SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2003). The court expressed the concern that any insider 
tipping case could be reframed as a misappropriation case, instead of a Dirks type classical insider trading case, 
thereby rendering the Dirks personal benefit requirement a dead letter. Id. at 1279. Another way that the courts 
could deal with this problem, however, would be to rule that the misappropriation theory, which was developed 
to deal with a different situation not involving the breach of duties to the persons on the other side of a trade, is 
simply not applicable to the issuer insider tipper. See infra Part V.A.1.b. 
 158.  See infra Section IV.A.3.d.iii. For a detailed discussion of these points and of the history of the case 
law to date, see Merritt B. Fox & George Tepe, Insider Trading: Personal Benefit Has No Place in 
Misappropriation Tipping Cases, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 25, 2017), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/25/insider-trading-personal-benefit-has-no-place-in-
misappropriation-tipping-cases/#comments. 
 159.  Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 160.  Id. at 1203. Cf. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 194 (7th Cir. 1978) (“If the corporation were to attempt 
to exploit such non-public information [usually involved in insider trading] by dealing in its own securities, it 
would open itself up to potential liability under federal and state securities laws, just as do the insiders when they 
engage in insider trading.”); Arlia ex rel. Massey Energy Co. v. Blankenship, 234 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610 (S.D.W. 
Va. 2002) (“[I]nsider trading does not rob the corporation of an opportunity, because securities laws prohibited 
the company itself from trading on its own nonpublic information.”).  
 161.  See supra Part V.A.2.c. 
 162.  See, e.g., Hyman v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 46 A.D.3d 335, 337 (2007) (“[I]t is well settled that a 
corporation does not owe fiduciary duties to its members or shareholders.”); Powers v. Ryan, No. CIV. A. 00-
10295-00, 2001 WL 92230, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2001) (“The case law is less settled on whether a corporation 
owes a fiduciary duty to a shareholder.”); see also WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER 
TRADING § 5.2.3(c)(1) (3d ed. 2010) (discussing issue in depth).  In terms of ex post fairness, it should be noted 
that unlike trades by insiders, the resulting losses suffered by the shareholders (or shareholders to be) transacting 
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2. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Evaluation 
How does the reach of Rule 10b-5’s prohibitions on informed trading compare with 
what the analysis in Part IV suggests are the socially undesirable informed trades? 
a. Fundamental Value Informed Trading 
We have concluded that fundamental value informed trading is socially desirable. 
Consistent with this recommendation, fundamental value informed trading is not 
prohibited by Rule 10b-5. It is not a violation under the classical theory because there is no 
relationship of trust and confidence between a fundamental value informed trader and the 
person with whom she transacts. It is also not a violation under the misappropriation theory: 
the fundamental value informed trader develops the information herself based on collecting 
bits of publicly available information and so there is no breach of a duty of confidentiality 
to the information’s source as required under that theory.163 
b. Announcement Information 
We concluded in Part IV that announcement informed trading is socially undesirable. 
Announcement trading is not prohibited by Rule 10b-5 because it involves trading on 
information that is, as a literal matter, publicly available. New law imposing an outright 
ban on announcement trading is probably impractical: it would be difficult to define in 
legal terms what the reach of the prohibition should be in a way that would actually 
diminish the practice without at the same time chilling socially desirable trading. However, 
it can be reduced, as discussed below, by rules relating to the structure of market trading 
and to the timing of issuer announcements.164 
c. Inside Information: The Issuer as Source 
We concluded in Part IV that trades based on material, non-public information from 
within an issuer are, as a general matter, socially undesirable. This conclusion includes 
trades by the issuer itself and by issuer insiders and their direct and indirect tippees. 
Consent from the issuer is irrelevant. As reviewed above, existing interpretations of Rule 
10b-5 clearly prohibit such trades by the issuer and its insiders.165 The status of direct and 
indirect tippees is more complex. As we have seen, under Dirks, the Supreme Court finds 
some, but not all, selective disclosures of material, non-public information from inside an 
issuer to be Rule 10b-5 violations, and the same with respect to some, but not all, trades by 
outsiders based on these disclosures. For the tip by the insider to be a violation, it must be 
a breach of duty to the issuer’s shareholders.  This requires a violation of the insider’s duty 
to the corporation to keep the information confidential and, in addition, that the insider 
receives a personal benefit.  The trade of the outsider recipient is only a violation if it makes 
 
with the corporation are precisely balanced by the gains of the shareholders who did not transact. See also Donald 
C. Langevoort & Gaurang Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
1639, 1644–64 (2004) (discussing the distinctive features of issuer insider trading and Shaw). 
 163.  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, J. dissent) (citation omitted). 
 164.  See infra Part V.G. 
 165.  In contrast, we also concluded that trades based on one or more bits of non-public, immaterial 
information from within an issuer were not socially undesirable, and existing interpretations of Rule 10b-5 in fact 
do not find them illegal.   
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her a “participant after the fact” in the insider’s breach.166 This requires that she be aware 
of both the duty of confidentiality violation and the insider’s personal benefit.167 
The personal benefit test is an additional wrinkle added by Justice Powell in the Dirks 
case, apparently out of a fear of chilling analyst interviews. Our analysis in Part IV makes 
us sympathetic with the concern that when the insider tipper receives no personal benefit 
for passing on material information to the outsider tippee, imposing liability on either is 
likely to chill analyst interviews. The starting point to understanding this concern is to note 
that an analyst interview can give rise to either of two bases for profitable trading. One 
basis is where the interview reveals a large number of small, immaterial pieces of non-
public information that the analyst can use to develop a superior analysis of a stock’s value. 
For trades motivated by this basis, the social gain from the resulting price-accuracy 
improvements is likely to be greater than the social loss from the decline in liquidity. This 
conclusion rests on reasoning identical to the reasoning behind our conclusion in Part IV 
that there is a net social gain associated with fundamental value informed trading (which 
involves doing the same kind of analysis, but with publicly available or observable 
immaterial information bits)168 and behind the same conclusion with trades by insiders 
themselves based on non-public, immaterial information.169 
The second basis for an interview generating a trade is the revelation of a piece of 
material, non-public information. A trade on this basis would have exactly the same impact 
on price accuracy and liquidity as a trade by an insider based on the same information, 
which we have concluded involves a net social loss and should be prohibited. Determining 
whether or not to punish this second type of interview-generated trades—the socially 
undesirable ones based on material information—depends, however, on the effect of such 
punishment on the level of the first type of interview-generated trades—the socially 
desirable ones based on an analysis of immaterial information. We believe that if analyst 
interviews are unfettered by fear of liability (absent a personal benefit to the issuer 
spokesperson), there will be many more of them and that there will be a substantial increase 
in the first type of trades and only a modest increase in the second type of trades. This is 
because the protection arising from a lack of personal benefit only extends to unauthorized 
disclosures,170 and so they likely only occur by accident.171 Thus, we think that with 
 
 166.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. 
 167.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) (directing courts to look to “whether the insider receives a 
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will 
translate into future earnings”).  
 168.  See supra Part IV.A.4.b (comparing costs and benefits of fundamental value informed trading). 
 169.  See supra Part IV.C.4.b (discussing insider trading on small bits of non-public information). 
 170.  An authorized selective disclosure of material information raises very different issues. The prevailing 
view of the lower courts is that trading by an issuer when in possession of such information would violate Rule 
10b-5. See supra Part V.A.1.b.v (explaining informed trading by an issuer). By logical extension, it would 
presumably also be the view of these courts that the issuer would also violate Rule 10b-5 if its agent made an 
authorized tip of such information, as would a trade by its direct tippee or any indirect tippees if the trader were 
aware that the tip was authorized.   
 171.  Moreover, the issuer has an interest in preventing such accidents because the resulting effect on liquidity 
will lower its share price. Admittedly, there is the possibility that the firm, while not formally authorizing the 
disclosure, would wink at its agent providing the occasional material tip in return for either continued analyst 
coverage where there otherwise would not be any, or for more favorable coverage. Whether tips in return for 
analyst coverage are socially undesirable requires its own complex analysis, as does calculating the likelihood of 
tips in return for favorable coverage. See infra Part V.D.2 (discussing “Reg. FD”).  
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unfettered interviews, the net social gains from trades motivated by the first basis will be 
greater than net social losses from trades motivated by the second basis. This said, using a 
personal benefit test of some kind is best paired with a provision, such as Regulation FD 
discussed later in Part V, that in essence prohibits a firm from the intentional selective 
disclosure of material information when it is likely to be traded upon, and requires 
immediate public disclosure of such information if the firm discovers an inadvertent 
selective disclosure of such information. 
The current law’s imposition of the personal benefit test in tipper/tippee cases is one 
way of engaging in the doctrinal gymnastics of converting, as best one can, an anti-fraud 
rule into a policy-based regulation of informed trading capable of protecting analyst 
interviews. If the only choices were to retain or to eliminate the test, we would choose to 
retain it for this reason. As analyzed in the discussion below concerning the way forward 
under Rule 10b-5, however, we believe that the test too often provides defenses for indirect 
tippees trading on such information—trades that are just as socially undesirable as ones by 
an insider based on the same information. We will advocate an approach that presents much 
less of this problem, while still not chilling analyst interviews and continuing to respect the 
doctrinal foundations laid down by Supreme Court in Chiarella.172 
d. Inside Information: A Non-issuer Source 
Now consider material nonpublic information relevant to predicting the future cash 
flows paid to the holders of an issuer’s shares that comes from within an institution other 
than the issuer. We concluded in Part IV that trading based on such information is socially 
undesirable, but, unlike trading based on information from within the issuer, only when the 
source—the non-issuer institution—has failed to give permission. The reach of Rule 10b-
5’s prohibitions on trades based on such information generally includes the trades we 
believe are socially undesirable and leaves untouched the socially desirable ones. Again, 
the one problematic area relates to tippers and tippees, especially indirect tippees. 
Under the misappropriation theory approved by the Supreme Court’s majority opinion 
in O’Hagan, trading on non-public material information originating from an institution 
other than the issuer violates Rule 10b-5 when the trade involves a breach of a duty of 
confidentiality.173 Thus, where an insider of the institution, with its permission, trades or 
provides the information to others, there is no violation because there is no breach of the 
duty of confidentiality. Similarly, where an authorized agent of the institution provides 
such information to an outside recipient who trades on it or passes it on to others to trade 
on, there is no Rule 10b-5 violation because there is no breach by the insider with respect 
to which the recipient could be a participant after the fact. The exception to this would be 
where the outside recipient agreed to keep the information confidential or is otherwise in a 
relationship with the institution imposing a duty of confidentiality, circumstances that 
 
 172.  See infra Part V.C.3.b (discussing the process involving public announcements of generated 
information). 
 173.  Under O’Hagan, the only exception would be in the surreal situation where the insider, just in advance 
of breaching her duty of confidentiality to her employer, informs the employer of her intention to do so. See 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653–54 (1997) (laying out the exception to breaching duty of 
confidentiality). This is because the Court requires deceit for a trade to violate Rule 10b-5, but includes within 
the reach of what it understands as deceit the situation where an insider breaches her duty of confidentiality 
without affirmatively telling her employer that she is doing so. 
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would impose liability without reliance on the participant after the fact theory. 
While we approve of the results in the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Hagan 
affirming the misappropriation theory, the majority opinion justified the decision in part 
by saying that the prohibited trades are harmful to others in the market.174 This justification 
is incoherent because trades based on the same information that are approved by the non-
issuer institution are equally harmful to others in the market. Yet, these trades do not violate 
Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory, a point made forcefully by Justice Thomas 
in dissent.175 The analysis here provides an alternative, more coherent justification for the 
distinction between the transactions prohibited by the theory and those that are not. Each 
of these two kinds of trades—by decreasing liquidity—causes the same amount of harm to 
other market participants. The trades prohibited by the theory discourage production of and 
trading upon fundamental value information, whereas the permitted transactions encourage 
these socially valuable activities. 
To start the analysis of tippers and tippees under the misappropriation theory, consider 
information originating from an institution other than the issuer that, without the 
institution’s authority, is selectively disclosed by one of its insiders or by a person owing 
the institution a duty of confidentiality. Assume also that trading by a recipient upon the 
information is predictable and that the direct or indirect recipient who trades on it owes no 
duty of confidentiality to the institution or to any person in the chain through which it 
reached him. 
As analyzed in Part IV, the prospect of such trades reduces the incentives of outside 
institutions to produce such socially useful information. Such trades are thus socially 
undesirable.176 An optimal rule would prohibit any such trade where the trader knows, or 
should know, that the information was confidential, came originally from within the 
institution, and was selectively disclosed by an insider without the institution’s authority. 
This optimal rule should not pose a challenge to the Supreme Court’s Rule 10b-5 doctrinal 
foundations. The insider’s original disclosure of the information without authority violates 
Rule 10b-5 under the “misappropriation theory” because it involves a breach of a duty of 
confidentiality in connection with a predictable purchase or sale of a security. The trade 
makes the trader with this knowledge a “participant after the fact.”177 
As noted above—however—there is disagreement among the circuits whereby some 
courts have sought to add the personal benefit test as an additional requirement, a test that 
was originally developed for issuer insider tippers.178 We think that inserting the personal 
benefit test into the misappropriation theory is seriously misguided as a matter of both 
policy and doctrine. The central factual issue under the misappropriation theory is whether 
the insider of the non-issuer institution breached a duty of confidentiality to it by tipping 
or trading. Where he has, it means that the institution has not waived this duty when it 
could have. This institution finds the insider’s conduct disadvantageous whether or not the 
 
 174.  Id. at 655, 657 (a misappropriator’s trades harm members of the investing public). 
 175.  Justice Thomas, in dissent, points to this incoherence to conclude that such trading should not violate 
Rule 10b-5 whether or not the trader has permission. Id. at 680, 689–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (whether a trade 
is based on “disclosed misuse or authorized use [of information]—the hypothesized ‘inhibiting impact on market 
participation,’ would be identical to that from behavior violating the misappropriation theory”) (citation omitted). 
 176.  See supra Part IV.D.2. 
 177.  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980) (discussing how the “[t]he tippee’s obligation 
has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty”).  
 178.  See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (discussing the personal benefit test). 
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insider benefited personally and so allowing trading when there is no personal benefit is 
just as harmful to the incentives to do fundamental value research as when there is personal 
benefit. The Supreme Court added the personal benefit requirement in Dirks for a policy 
reason that is inapplicable to non-issuer-information cases, i.e., fear that analyst interviews 
will otherwise be chilled. Insiders of companies considering hostile takeovers, financial 
printers, law firms, or investment banking firms do not give socially valuable interviews to 
market analysts about the future prospects of companies about which they have knowledge, 
nor does a spouse sharing a confidence with her mate. Adding the personal benefit test 
leaves many socially undesirable trades beyond the reach of Rule 10b-5’s prohibitions for 
no good reason. 
B. The Way Forward Under Rule 10b-5 
Overall, the current reach of Rule 10b-5 conforms reasonably closely with what is 
recommended in Part IV. Fundamental value informed trading—which we find socially 
desirable—is permitted. Announcement trading—which we find undesirable—is also 
permitted, but we do not believe that an outright prohibition is the best way of dealing with 
announcement trading. Rule 10b-5’s current reach prohibits trading by issuer insiders 
based on material nonpublic information from within the issuer. This is consistent with our 
findings that such trades are on average socially undesirable and that it is not 
administratively practical to distinguish the desirable from the undesirable trades based on 
the nature of the information, the timing of the trade, or the issuer’s particular 
circumstances.  The current reach of Rule 10b-5 permits trades by issuer insiders based on 
immaterial nonpublic information from inside the issuer, trades which we find on average 
to be socially desirable. We also find to be socially undesirable unauthorized trading in an 
issuer’s shares by an insider of an entity other than the issuer based on material nonpublic 
information from within that entity. This trading too is prohibited under Rule 10b-5’s 
current reach. 
The one problematic area with respect to the regulation of trading based on both types 
of inside information is the current law’s application of Rule 10b-5 to tippers and tippees. 
In terms of its direct impact on liquidity and price accuracy, a trade by a tippee, whether 
direct or indirect, is just as socially desirable as if the trade were instead undertaken by the 
insider herself. Ideally, then, there should be a blanket prohibition on all tippee trades—
and the tipping the led to them—where the trade would have been prohibited if instead the 
inside tipper herself had been the trader.179 The one exception would be a trade by an 
analyst—or the entity that employs him—who receives material non-public information in 
an interview with an insider where granting the overall interview is within the insider’s 
authority but not the disclosure of the particular piece of non-public information. Although 
such a trade is just as socially undesirable as if the insider had made it, we concluded above 
that it should be shielded from punishment in order to avoid chilling analyst interviews.180 
Rule 10b-5’s prohibitions on tippee trading, based on current court interpretations, 
fall well short of this ideal.  As for trading by outsiders based on information originating 
from within the issuer, the personal benefit rule protects from punishment far more such 
 
 179.  There should be evidence also that the tippee knows, or has good reason to believe, that the information 
came from an insider source. 
    180. See supra Part V.A.1.b.iii 
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trades than need to be protected in order to achieve the goal of avoiding chilling of analyst 
interviews. As for trading by outsiders based on information originating from within an 
entity other than the issuer, courts have been increasingly inserting the personal benefit 
rule in determining whether there has been a Rule 10b-5 violation. Doing so is not justified 
for policy reasons because punishing such trades would in no way chill analyst interviews. 
These existing interpretations of Rule 10b-5 are not written in stone, however.  They are 
the product of a common law process that will continue to evolve. The challenge going 
forward is to shape the law’s future evolution in a direction that comes as close as possible 
to the ideal set out above, while also paying due deference to the process’s doctrinal roots. 
 
1. Problems with the Existing Law Concerning Trading by Outsiders Based on 
Information Originating from within the Issuer of the Traded Shares 
We have seen that under existing case law, a person outside of an issuer who trades 
on the basis of material non-public information originating from within the traded shares’ 
issuer cannot be found in violation of Rule 10b-5 unless the government or other plaintiff 
can show that the trader knew both that, (1) the insider source, in communicating the 
information to someone outside the issuer, breached her duty to the issuer to keep the 
information confidential, and (2) the insider source received a personal benefit from doing 
so.181 
This requirement to show personal benefit will usually not pose a significant obstacle 
for the government or other plaintiff to establish a Rule 10b-5 violation in cases where 
there is in fact such a personal benefit and it takes the form of a gift. However, it poses a 
more significant obstacle where the benefit instead takes the form of a quid pro quo, 
especially in cases against indirect tippees. 
a. Personal Benefit in the Form of a Gift 
Where the insider tipper did in fact enjoy a personal benefit but it was in the form of 
making a gift to the direct tippee, the government or other plaintiff will usually not have 
much difficulty making the required showing of this fact. This is likely the case whether 
the defendant is the direct tippee or an indirect tippee. 
Consider first a case against a direct tippee. In Salman, the Supreme Court decided 
that evidence of the existence of a close family or friendship relationship is, by itself, 
sufficient for a jury to infer that the insider tipper was making a gift of a kind that satisfies 
the personal benefit test.182 Because people do not tend to do random acts of kindness, 
most gift cases presumably involve such a relationship. Where such a relationship exists 
and the case is against the initial tippee, the tippee would obviously be aware of the 
relationship because he would be a party to it. So, simply showing the existence of the 
relationship should, under Salman, be sufficient to show the outsider recipient’s knowledge 
of the gift and hence that the insider’s personal benefit. 
Things should not be a great deal more difficult for the government or other plaintiff 
 
 181.  See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing violations of Rule 10b-5 under current law). This assumes that there 
was no independent basis for the tippee to owe a duty of confidentiality to the issuers.  
 182.  Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
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where the action is instead against an indirect tippee, and where, again, the insider tipper, 
and the initial tippee have a close family or friendship relationship. Any indirect tippee 
who knows enough to have good reason to believe that the information’s original source 
was an insider and that the information is reliable would be unlikely to have come to these 
conclusions without also knowing about the existence of the relationship between the 
insider and the initial tippee.183 And, again, evidence that the indirect tippee knew of this 
relationship is sufficient under Salman to show the indirect tippee’s knowledge that the 
insider’s tip was a gift and hence the insider enjoyed a personal benefit. 
b. Personal Benefit in the Form of a Quid Pro Quo 
Now consider the situation where the insider tipper enjoyed a personal benefit, but it 
was in the form of a quid pro quo—such as the sharing of profits with the direct tippee or 
the prospect of reciprocal tips.  The government or other plaintiff will often have much 
more trouble making the required showing of a personal benefit. If the defendant is the 
direct tippee, she would clearly be aware of the benefit that she conferred upon the insider, 
but evidence establishing that she gave such a benefit is often hard for the government or 
other plaintiff to obtain. The problem is compounded in the case of an indirect tippee. Not 
only does the government or other plaintiff need to find sufficient evidence that the direct 
tippee provided the tipper with a quid pro quo, it must show that the indirect tippee had 
actual knowledge of this fact. This will not be possible in many cases. It is again true the 
tip is unlikely to impel the indirect tippee to trade unless he has good reason to believe the 
information’s original source is an insider and that the information is reliable. The indirect 
tippee, however, can easily acquire sufficient facts to come to these conclusions without 
acquiring any facts specifying that the insider received a quid pro quo from the initial 
tippee. 
c. An Alternative Approach to Outsiders Trading on Information Originating from Within 
the Issuer 
To solve the problems described immediately above, we propose an alternative 
approach that involves a reversal of the evidentiary burden concerning personal benefit. 
Relative to the current court interpretations of Rule 10b-5, this alternative will likely make 
subject to punishment many more trades by direct and indirect tippees based on material 
non-public information coming from within the issuer. Hence it should deter far more such 
trades from occurring. Yet, it would be equally protective of analyst interviews as is current 
law. And it would be equally consistent as current law with the doctrinal foundations laid 
out in Chiarella concerning the application of Rule 10b-5 to informed trading. 
d. The Substance of the Alternative Approach: The Insider Tipper and the Direct Tippee 
Under the alternative approach, the insider source would be found to violate Rule 10b-
5 if she disclosed to an outsider non-public material information likely to be traded upon 
 
 183.  If the indirect tippee cannot reliably determine that the information is reliable and from an insider 
source, a Rule 10b-5 violation is unlikely in any event. Materiality is a necessary element for a Rule 10b-5 insider 
trading violation. The materiality of a rumor depends in part on “it[s] reliability in light of its nature and source 
and the circumstances under which it was received.” In Re Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 SEC 633, 670 
(1971). 
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unless the insider provides persuasive evidence that the reason she did so was not for a 
Dirks-type personal benefit. Similarly, if the direct tippee knows, or has good reason to 
believe, that the information came from an insider source and trades on the information (or 
tips it to someone else likely to trade on it), he would be found to have violated Rule 10b-
5 unless he provides the same kind of persuasive evidence that the insider tipper had a non-
personal-benefit reason for disclosing. 
When an issuer insider makes a selective disclosure to an outsider of material non-
public information that she can expect will be traded upon, some reason motivates the 
disclosure. Four possible reasons largely exhaust the possibilities. Three relate to the 
disclosure of information that issuer deemed should be kept confidential: (1) an expectation 
of a quid pro quo; (2) an intention to benefit the outsider initial recipient; and (3) any other 
motivator for the insider to disclose the information despite the issuer deeming that it be 
kept confidential. A fourth possible reason is that the issuer determined that information 
should be selectively disclosed to a person likely to trade on it and insider conveying the 
information to the outsider was simply the issuer’s authorized agent for doing so.184 The 
rationale for our proposed alternative approach will become clear as we consider how this 
approach would work in connection with disclosures made for each of these four reasons. 
i. Trades Based on Tips Made for Personal Benefit Reasons 
Suppose that the tipper’s disclosure was in fact motivated by one of the first two 
reasons: the expectation of a quid pro quo or the tipper’s intention to benefit the tippee. If 
all the facts were known to the parties at the time of the tip, and to the court later on, the 
insider tipper and the initial tippee would clearly be found to have violated Rule 10b-5.185 
As we have seen, the problem under existing law is that it is often going to be very difficult 
for the government or other plaintiff to find affirmative evidence that the insider tipper 
enjoyed a personal benefit, at least where it takes the quid pro quo form. Under the 
proposed alternative approach, however, it will be much easier for the government or other 
plaintiff to successfully prosecute a Rule 10b-5 case against the tipper and direct tippee. 
This is because each would have great difficulty affirmatively producing convincing 
evidence that the reason for the initial source’s disclosure was not for one of these first two 
reasons when in fact it was. Thus, under the alternative approach proposed here, personal 
benefit considerations would be much less likely to obstruct punishment of persons 
 
 184.  Note the distinction between the third and fourth reasons. Neither involves the insider tipper enjoying 
a personal benefit. In the fourth, however, the selective disclosure of confidential material information has been 
authorized by the issuer. Disclosures for the third reason typically occur within the context of analyst interviews. 
So, in contrast to disclosures for the fourth reason, the selective disclosure of the particular information at issue 
was not authorized even though the conversation within which the disclosure occurs was. The non-personal-
benefit reason that the insider tipper disclosed information she is supposed to keep confidential would most often 
be that she mistakenly believes either that the information is immaterial or is already public. The Dirks case itself 
provides a very unusual example of an unauthorized tip where there is no personal benefit: to reveal publicly a 
fraud within the corporation. If this, or some other unusual but meritorious motivation, were the reason, the source 
should be able to provide evidence to this effect and thus, appropriately, would not be found to violate Rule 10b-
5.   
 185.  In trades motivated by one of the first two reasons, the facts, if known, would establish the personal 
benefit required by Dirks and so there would be a Rule 10b-5 violation. In the trade motivated by the fourth 
reason, there would be no personal benefit, but the tipper would nevertheless be participating in the Rule 10b-5 
violation.   
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involved in a transaction that was in fact motivated by one of the first two reasons. This is 
a transaction that would be found to violate Rule 10b-5 under current law if all the facts 
were known and that our analysis in Part IV suggests is socially undesirable. 
ii. Trades Based on the Unauthorized Selective Disclosure of Information for Reasons 
Other than Personal Benefit 
Now consider the situation where the disclosure was motivated by the third type of 
reason: any motivator for making an unauthorized selective disclosure of material non-
public information other than for personal benefit. The most common example would be 
where the recipient is an analyst and that the disclosure occurs during an interview, facts 
easy for both the insider source and the direct recipient to establish. Absent anything to the 
contrary, this evidence would be sufficient to establish the absence of personal benefit. 
Thus, in this situation, the alternative approach would protect both the insider tipper and 
direct tippee from being found to have violated Rule 10b-5, the same result as under current 
law. In other words, our proposed alternative approach would be just as effective at 
protecting analyst interviews—the concern that prompted shielding from Rule 10b-5 
punishment trades of trades motivated by the third reason—while making it much easier to 
prosecute cases involving trades based on tips made for either of the first two reasons, i.e., 
ones which would be found to have violated Rule 10b-5 if all the facts were known.186 
iii. Trades Based on Authorized Selective Disclosure 
Finally, consider trades motivated by the fourth reason: a selective disclosure of 
material non-public information to someone likely to trade on the information where the 
disclosure is authorized by the issuer. The individual insider making the disclosure could 
very well be making the disclosure without personal benefit. If so and the disclosure occurs 
within the context of an analyst interview, both the insider tipper and the direct tippee will 
again almost certainly be in possession of, and able to introduce, persuasive evidence to 
this effect. Therefore an absence of personal benefit will be presumed. However, recall, as 
noted earlier in this Article, that existing case law and commentary suggest that Rule 10b-
5 is violated when an issuer trades in its own shares based on material non-public 
information that it possesses. They suggest a violation as well when the issuer tips this 
information to an outsider likely to trade on it, who in turn can be liable as a participant 
after the fact in the issuer’s violation. Thus, the issuer and the tippee trader would be found 
to violate Rule 10b-5 if all the facts were known, as would the individual tipper in his 
actions as the agent of the issuer. The proof problem here for the government or other 
plaintiff does not relate to personal benefit. It relates to demonstrating that the tip was 
authorized and, for the action against the direct tippee, that the tippee was aware of this 
fact. 
e. The Substance of the Alternative Approach: The Indirect Tippee 
What, though, about an indirect tippee? Where disclosure by the insider tippee is made 
 
 186.  Where the analyst does not trade herself, but makes a private recommendation based on a professional 
relationship with the actual trader, it is socially undesirable to punish the actual trader’s trade because doing so 
would chill analyst interviews. This relationship means, however, that the analyst would likely provide the actual 
trader with the evidence needed under the alternative approach to protect her from punishment.  
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for one of the first two reasons, the indirect tippee is in very much the same position as the 
direct tippee: she will have great difficulty affirmatively producing convincing evidence 
that the reason for the initial source’s disclosure was not for one of these first two reasons 
when in fact it was. 
Where the disclosure is made for the third reason, the indirect tippee is in a different 
position than the direct tippee. Unlike the direct tippee, she might well not be able to 
provide evidence that the disclosure was for the third reason when in fact it was. Thus, 
under the proposed alternative approach, the indirect tippee of such a disclosure might well 
be found to violate Rule 10b-5. This result, however, is good from a policy point of view. 
The indirect tippee’s trade is just as socially undesirable as if the insider tipper had traded 
on the information himself. And, unlike punishing the insider tipper or direct tippee when 
the disclosure is made for the third reason, punishing the indirect tippee for trading on the 
same disclosure will not chill analyst interviews. This is because the indirect tippee is not 
a party to such an interview. This result also does not create any serious doctrinal problems. 
Given the available evidence, it would be assumed under the proposed alternative approach 
that the initial tipper either enjoyed a personal benefit, or was authorized to make the 
selective disclosure to someone likely to trade on it and hence was participating in the 
issuer’s illegal tipping. Whichever it is, the insider tipper would be assumed to have 
violated Rule 10b-5 and the indirect tippee would be assumed to know of the violation. 
This would allow the indirect tippee to be considered a participant after the fact to a Rule 
10b-5 type breach by the insider source.187 
Where the disclosure is made for the fourth reason, again the indirect tippee might be 
unable to provide evidence suggesting an absence of personal benefit even when in fact 
there was not one. Thus, under the proposed alternative approach, this indirect tippee might 
well be found to violate Rule 10b-5 even though the government or other plaintiff offered 
no evidence that the tip was authorized and that the indirect tippee knew that it was 
authorized. Again, however, it is not unfortunate that the indirect tippee is found to have 
violated Rule 10b-5. The indirect tippee’s trade is socially undesirable and there is no 
reason to protect him from punishment in order to avoid chilling analyst interviews. It 
would be evidently illegal if all the facts were actually known. 
f. Implementation 
As discussed earlier, a tippee trade does not fit in easily under the classical theory first 
articulated by Justice Powell in his opinion in Chiarella.188 The problem is that the tippee 
does not have the theory’s required relationship of trust and confidence with the 
counterparty to his trade.189 In the same opinion, however, Justice Powell, in dicta, 
suggested a solution to this problem by saying that the tippee could be considered a 
“participant after the fact” to the tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty.190 Powell’s Chiarella 
 
 187.  Despite the policy desirability of punishing the indirect tippee’s trade, if he can provide evidence that 
the initial disclosure was motivated by the third reason, he would not be found under the proposed alternative 
approach to have violated Rule 10b-5. This is because it would then be possible for the indirect tippee to establish 
that the insider source did not commit a Rule 10b-5 type breach. So, there would be no finding of a breach in 
which the indirect tippee could be a participant after the fact.   
 188.  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 189.  Id. at 223. 
 190.  Id. at 230 n.12 (citations omitted). 
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opinion makes no mention of the insider needing to have enjoyed a personal benefit for 
there to be a breach of his fiduciary duty when he makes an unauthorized selective 
disclosure of material non-public information to someone likely to trade on it.191  Nor does 
it make mention of the tippee needing be aware of such a benefit.192 The authorities cited 
by Powell also make no mention of requiring that the tipper enjoy a personal benefit or that 
the tippee be aware of the benefit. Powell’s policy concern in Chiarella is with the 
unfairness of the ex post loss suffered by others trading on unfavorable terms because the 
insider breached his duty to keep the information confidential.193 This loss is just as present 
whether the insider enjoyed a personal benefit or not. The idea of imposing a personal 
benefit test does not appear in the law until three years later in Powell’s opinion in Dirks.194 
There, after expressing concern that analyst interviews could be chilled unless both the 
insider representative of the issuer and the analyst were protected from liability, Powell 
holds that the insider must enjoy a personal benefit for there to be a violation.195 
Against this background, how could the law evolve to implement the alternative 
approach’s reversal of the evidentiary burden? The more modest way would be for the 
courts to establish a rebuttable presumption that an insider who is making an unauthorized 
disclosure of confidential information is receiving a personal benefit. Again, the rationale 
for such a presumption is straightforward. A significant portion of such disclosures involve 
a personal benefit. And it is easier for the insider source and original outside recipient to 
come up with evidence that the insider disclosed for a non-personal-benefit reason when 
this is the case, than it is for the government or a private plaintiff to come up with evidence 
that the reason for the disclosure was personal benefit when that is the case. 
Implementing the alternative approach by creating a presumption of personal benefit 
has the advantage of being just an evidentiary rule based on its own internal logic. Thus, it 
does not involve a direct challenge to the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Dirks. This 
route to implementation has the important disadvantage, however, that the law governing 
criminal procedure generally disfavors use of a presumption in criminal cases.196 
The more ambitious route to implementation is for the Supreme Court, or Congress, 
to directly revise the holding in Dirks in accordance with the alternative approach proposed 
here. Revising the Dirks holding in this way is supported by sound reasoning. The revision 
is as plausible an outgrowth of the foundational Chiarella decision as is approach dictated 
by the holding in Dirks. It would be as effective as the Dirks holding in avoiding chilling 
analyst interviews, which was the reason for adding the personal benefit test in the first 
place. And it has the advantage of making it less difficult to establish a Rule 10b-5 violation 
 
 191.  See generally id. 
 192.  See generally id. 
 193.  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980). 
 194.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).  
 195.  Id. 
 196.  See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 326–27 (1985) (reversing conviction based on jury 
instruction imposing presumption); Sandstrom v. Mont., 442 U.S. 510, 510 (1979) (holding a jury instruction 
creating a presumption is unconstitutional). Still, the combination of civil remedies available to the government 
and private damages suits are sufficiently threatening to create a significant deterrent. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) 
(2015) (authorizing various forms of SEC penalties and remedies).  
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in both civil and criminal cases against direct and indirect tippees.197 
g. Trading by Outsiders on the Basis of Non-public Information Originating within Non-
issuer Institutions 
As discussed earlier, there is currently legal uncertainty as to whether the personal 
benefit test applies just to tipping cases based on the classical theory of insider trading, 
where it was originally developed, or whether it extends as well to tipping cases based on 
the misappropriation theory.198 The key distinction between the two theories is that the 
classical theory deals only with cases involving information coming from inside the issuer 
whose shares are being traded, whereas the misappropriation theory was developed to deal 
with cases involving information coming from within an institution other than the issuer. 
As also discussed earlier, there are both strong policy and strong doctrinal reasons to 
conclude that the test should not extend to cases based on the misappropriation theory.199 
Here the way forward is simple. The Supreme Court, or some developing consensus among 
the lower courts, simply needs to make clear that the personal benefit test should be 
confined to cases based on the classical theory. 
C. Use of the Martin Act Regulation to Stop Informed Trading 
Many states also have anti-fraud securities laws, but they have not historically been a 
potent source of prohibitions on informed trading. New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman’s recent use of the state’s Martin Act is an exception.200 As detailed below, 
Schneiderman recently shut down Thompson Reuters’ practice of privately providing to 
select traders the latest results of the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey moments in 
advance of announcing the results publicly,201 condemning it as “Insider Trading 2.0”202 
Under the same banner, he persuaded BlackRock, the largest asset manager worldwide, to 
stop surveying the opinions of financial analysts prior to the analysts publishing their 
reports.203 This use of state law to extend the range of prohibitions on informed trading to 
 
 197.  An even more ambitious revision would be to make the alternative approach applicable only to the 
insider source and his initial outside recipient and to deny the affirmative defense to any indirect tippee. This 
would bring the reach of Rule 10b-5’s prohibitions closer to the ideal set out in Part IV, but would begin to be in 
tension with the doctrinal roots found in Chiarella. 
 198.  See supra Part V.A.1.b.iv (discussing tipper and tippee liability when information is not derived from 
the issuer). 
 199.  See supra Part V.A.2.d. (discussing when the tippee and tipper do not belong to the issuing institution). 
 200.  The Martin Act prohibits “any fraud, deception, concealment, suppression [or] false pretense” in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-c (1982). It has been interpreted 
as banning “all deceitful practices contrary to the plain rules of common honesty” including “all acts . . . which 
do by their tendency . . . deceive or mislead the purchasing public.” People v. Federated Radio, 154 N.E. 655, 
656–57 (N.Y. 1926). 
 201.  Thompson Reuters in turn had purchased distribution rights to these results from the developers of the 
survey. See generally Hu et al., supra note 27. 
 202.  Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Secures Agreement By 
Thomson Reuters To Stop Offering Early Access To Market-Moving Information (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-agreement-thomson-reuters-stop-offering-early-
access-market.  
 203.  See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces 
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cover these practices is ill advised in our view. 
1. Practices Not Prohibited by Rule 10b-5 
The practice of a non-issuer institution privately providing select traders with 
information in advance of its public announcement is clearly not prohibited by Rule 10b-5 
because it does not fit under either of the classical theory or the misappropriation theory. 
Neither the information generating institution nor the select traders have a relationship of 
trust and confidence with the counterparties to the traders’ trades and a subsequent public 
announcement does not change this fact.  So failing to provide the information to these 
counterparties breaches no duty to them, as required under the classical theory.204 The 
institution voluntarily gives the information to the select persons to trade upon. So they do 
not, by trading, deceptively breach a duty of confidentiality to the source of their 
information, as required under the alternative misappropriation theory.205 
2. The Successful Martin Act Campaign Against “Insider Trading 2.0.” 
Notwithstanding the legality under federal law of Thompson Reuters tipping select 
traders in advance of its public announcement of the Consumer Sentiment Survey, 
Schneiderman, through the use of the Martin Act’s investigatory powers, was able to stop 
the practice without even filing a complaint.206 The Attorney General terminated his 
investigation of Thompson Reuters (and later BlackRock) when each agreed not to engage 
in this practice in the future.207 
3. Evaluation 
The Thompson Reuters affair involved an ill-advised use of the Attorney General’s 
investigatory power under the Martin Act. As set out below, a simple extension of our 
analysis in Part IV shows that the practice of a non-issuer institution privately providing 
select traders with information in advance of its public announcement is unlikely to be 
 
Agreement With BlackRock To End Its Analyst Survey Program Worldwide (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-agreement-blackrock-end-its-analyst-survey-
program-worldwide (noting that analyst survey was considered the world’s largest). 
 204.  See supra notes 129–134 and accompanying text. 
 205.  See supra notes 135–141 and accompanying text.  
 206.  Moreover, broad as the Martin Act’s actual language and court interpretations of this language are, it is 
hard to argue that a non-issuer institution violates the Act simply by staying silent at the time that it provides 
information to select traders and then, after these traders have a chance to trade, announcing the information 
publicly. See supra note 200. Still one cannot rule out the possibility that the Attorney General could have 
persuaded a court to find a violation if he were able to show that the investing public clearly assumed no trader 
was receiving the information in advance of its public announcement. This possibility was not tested, however. 
The Attorney General was ultimately able to obtain the agreement of Thompson Reuters and Bloomberg not to 
engage in the practice in the future simply by issuing it them a subpoena, a procedure that does not require him 
or her to provide a coherent explanation, subject to court review, of how the available evidence suggests the real 
possibility of a violation. This is because the Martin Act gives the Attorney General the power to issue such a 
subpoena on his or her own initiative. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ART. 23-A, §352 (1960). Thus, to get the subpoena, 
he or she is not required, unlike in an ordinary criminal proceeding, to get a court order by showing probable 
cause or to convene a court supervised grand jury, or, unlike in a civil action, to file a complaint that is subject to 
court review pursuant to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  
 207.  Id. 
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socially undesirable.208 Indeed, it appears that allowing such informed trading is socially 
positive, though probably just modestly. Thus, the absence of a federal prohibition on this 
practice gets things right, and it was ill advised to use the investigatory powers under New 
York’s Martin Act’s to stop “Insider Trading 2.0.” 
a. Possible Uses by Outsiders of the Information They Generate about Issuers 
The starting point for the analysis is to note that a non-issuer institution that has 
generated information of value for assessing an issuer’s stock (or has purchased it, directly 
or indirectly, from a person that has generated it) can use this information in three possible 
ways: (1) trade on the information; (2) provide it privately to certain other traders; or (3) 
announce the information publicly. As discussed, we view it as socially desirable to allow 
such an institution to use the information in the first or second way or in a combination of 
the two.209 This is based on our conclusion that the social gains from the resulting 
additional incentives for non-issuer institutions to generate price-accuracy-enhancing 
information outweigh the social losses in terms of real resources needed to generate the 
information and the increase in informed trading’s negative impact on liquidity.210 
b. Using Generated Information to make a Public Announcement 
If this reasoning concerning the first and second uses of the information is correct, the 
third use—publicly announcing the information—must also be socially desirable. A non-
issuer institution that contemplates this third use presumably incurs the expense of 
generating or obtaining the information because it expects to be compensated by the 
goodwill or enhanced reputation that results from the information’s public 
announcement.211 So, allowing public announcement of this information provides a 
desirable additional incentive. As with allowing the institution to trade on the information 
itself or to sell it privately to others to trade upon, there is also a liquidity-decreasing 
downside to allowing its public announcement, in this case from the trade of announcement 
traders.  This negative impact on liquidity, however, is certainly no greater than if the 
institution had instead just traded on the information, a practice which we have concluded 
on balance should be allowable.212 
c. Combining Providing the Information to Select Traders Privately with Subsequently 
 
 208.  If, in contrast, the non-issuer institution affirmatively misleads the public into believing that it is not 
engaging in the practice, the practice would be socially undesirable because it might result in prices being 
temporally distorted by the announcement given that investors would not understand that the price at that moment 
already reflected the information. Such an affirmative statement misleading the public, however, would also 
violate Rule 10b-5, which prohibits, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, “mak[ing] any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading..” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 209.  See infra Part V.A.2.d. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  See supra Part IV.D.1 and accompanying text. 
 212.  The negative impact on liquidity in fact would most likely be much less than if the institution traded on 
the information.  Announcement traders have much less time to trade (a period measured at most in seconds) than 
would the institution (a period measured probably in days) and so they cannot extract nearly as much profit from 
their informed trading than the institution could trading itself.  Less profit means less impact on liquidity because 
liquidity suppliers, in their setting of the bid ask spread, need to protect themselves less.   
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Announcing It Publicly 
Finally, if, as we conclude here, each of these three uses of a piece of information 
should be allowable on its own, there is nothing in the logic justifying each of these uses 
that suggests that they suddenly become toxic when two or more are combined, including 
the combination of providing the information privately to select persons to trade and 
announcing it publicly thereafter. 
D. The Broad Scale Legislative Approach to Informed Trading Prohibitions 
A broad scale legislative approach is an alternative to the scheme of informed trading 
prohibitions developed in a common law fashion through court interpretations of 10b-5. 
Two such legislative approaches will be considered: the EU’s longstanding Market Abuse 
Directive213 and the proposed Insider Trading Prohibition Act214 recently introduced in 
Congress. Each corrects for some of the shortcomings of the prevailing U.S. Rule 10b-5 
scheme, but neither includes within the reach the full set of informed trades that optimally 
should be prohibited. Moreover, the Market Abuse Directive calls for prohibiting some 
informed trades that optimally should be allowed.  Ultimately, we conclude that it would 
be better for the United States to continue to use the current Rule 10b-5 regime and adopt 
only narrowly crafted legislation to fill in some of its holes. 
1. EU Market Abuse Directive 
The EU Market Abuse Directive (the “Directive”) directs member countries to 
prohibit a wide range of persons215 from trading on the basis of, or tipping, “inside 
information,” which is defined as information relating to an issuer that is “of a precise 
nature which has not been made public . . . and which, if it were made public, would be 
likely to have a significant effect on” the price of the issuer’s securities.216 Thus, this 
approach does not depend on the existence of any relationship of trust and confidence or 
duty of confidentiality and does not differentiate between information coming from within 
the issuer and from within a non-issuer institution. While, on the surface, the Directive 
looks like it calls for a “parity of information” approach that goes beyond even Justice 
Blackmun’s structural access theory in his dissent in Chiarella, a closer look reveals that 
it, in fact, excepts from its prohibitions a variety of kinds of informed trading. 
a. Fundamental Value, Announcement, and Issuer Insider Informed Trading 
The Directive appears to reach so broadly that it would prohibit all fundamental value 
informed trading based on information of significance, but a “whereas clause” clarifies that 
“research and estimates developed from publicly available data should not be regarded as 
 
 213.  See Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC) 7 [hereinafter “Council Directive”]. The 
Directive has recently morphed into an EU regulation that includes the same substantive prohibitions discussed 
here, but with an expanded reach that covers additional instruments and trading occurring on unregulated venues.  
For background information on this development, see Davis Polk, The New EU Market Abuse Regulation: Key 
Issues for U.S. Investors (June 15, 2016), available at https://www.davispolk.com/files/2016-6-
15_New_EU_MAR_Key_Issues_US_Issuers.pdf 
 214.  Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).  
 215.  Council Directive art. 2(1). 
 216.  Id. at art. 1(1). 
880 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 43:4 
inside information.”217 Like Rule 10b-5, the Directive appears to permit announcement 
trading because “inside information” includes only information “not made public.”218 Also 
like Rule 10b-5, it prohibits issuer insiders from trading on material non-public information 
from inside the issuer,219 but permits them to trade on immaterial information from this 
source.220 Thus, in these regards, the Directive, like Rule 10b-5, prohibits tje kinds of 
informed trading that Part IV suggests should be prohibited and allows kinds it suggests 
should be allowed. 
b. Tippers and Tippees with Regard to Information from within the Issuer 
With regard to tippers and tippees of information from within the issuer, the Directive, 
judged by the recommendations in Part IV, is in some ways superior, and in other ways 
inferior, to Rule 10b-5 as currently interpreted. For there to be a violation, the Directive 
does not require that an issuer insider receive a personal benefit for making the tip of 
nonpublic material information. Instead, it has a general prohibition against “disclosing 
inside information to any other person,” but excepts disclosures made “in the normal course 
of the exercise of [the disclosing person’s] employment, profession or duties.”221 The way 
that this general prohibition and exception operate in combination does not appear to work 
as well as Rule 10b-5 in avoiding chilling analyst interviews because the scheme does not 
seem to recognize that such interviews are two-sided. The exception works as well as the 
personal benefit test (or our proposed alternative) in immunizing issuer representatives 
participating in such interviews, thus avoiding chilling their participation. However, 
contrary to the recommendations here and Rule 10b-5, analysts who trade on material 
information received in such interviews, or who privately recommend that their employer 
or others trade on the information, would be in violation,222 thus chilling analyst 
willingness to engage in such interviews. 
The Directive has a catchall provision, Article 4, that relates to any person beyond 
those with respect to whom there are specified prohibitions relating to informed trading 
and tipping. Article 4 prohibits trading or tipping if such a person “possesses inside 
information while that person knows, or ought to have known, that it is inside 
information.”223 It is therefore much easier to make the case that such person has 
committed a violation than currently under Rule 10b-5, where, without our proposed 
alternative approach, it is necessary to show that the person knew of the original tipper’s 
personal benefit. Thus, the Directive’s provisions more effectively deter a range of trades 
based on information from inside an issuer that the analysis in Part IV finds socially 
undesirable: trades by direct tippees outside the analyst interview situation and by indirect 
tippees generally. 
 
 217.  Council Directive § 31.  For expository convenience, the text and notes from hereon will be written as 
though the Directive has direct effect on persons engaging in, or associated with, informed trading. In fact, an EU 
directive simply directs member states to adopt legislation that has these effects.  
 218.  Id. at art. 1(1). 
 219.  Id. at art. 2(1). 
 220.  The definition of “inside information” includes only information “likely to have a significant effect on 
[price].” Id. 
 221.  Id. at art. 3(1)(a).  
 222.  The analyst would be prohibited from trading by the Directive’s Article 2(1)(c) and from advising others 
to do so by its Article 3(b).   
 223.  Council Directive art. 4. 
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c. Trades Based on Information Originating from within a Non-issuer Institution 
Trades based on nonpublic material information initially selectively disclosed by an 
insider of a non-issuer institution are treated differently under the Directive depending on 
the nature of the information. Consider first the situation where the information is purely 
the results of an analysis. Informed trading based on this information, whether the trader 
receives it directly or indirectly, appears to be allowed because it is not considered “inside 
information.”224 This is so even if the trader has good reason to believe that the institution 
did not authorize the information’s disclosure or the trader has some kind of duty of 
confidentiality to her source, situations involving socially undesirable trades according to 
Part IV225 that would violate Rule 10b-5.226 
Next, consider the situation where the analysis leads to a plan to engage in a purchase 
(for example, a takeover bid) or to sell enough of the issuer’s stock to likely have a 
significant effect on price. Suppose the institution discloses the plan to a select group of 
traders. Knowledge of the planned transaction would fit the definition of “inside 
information” even though the analysis that prompted the planned transaction would not. 
The Directive’s catchall Article 4 would appear to prohibit all trades by outsiders based on 
such information as long as the trader has good reason to believe that it is material and 
nonpublic.227 These are trades that our Part IV analysis suggests should be allowed228 and 
would not violate Rule 10b-5.229 
d. Summary 
In sum, the reach of the Directive’s informed trading prohibitions is somewhat 
different than the reach of Rule 10b-5’s prohibitions. Each system prohibits some tips and 
trades that our analysis suggests should be prohibited and that the other system fails to 
prohibit. The Directive also prohibits some trades that our analysis suggests should be not 
prohibited and that are not prohibited under Rule 10b-5. Overall, the Directive is not 
hobbled by the personal benefit rule test nor does it require a showing of knowledge by the 
trader of a prior breach of some duty in many situations where it would be socially desirable 
to punish a trade. It is less attuned, however, to the need to allow certain profitable trades 
that create incentives to generate price-accuracy-improving information. 
2. Insider Trading Prohibition Act 
A bipartisan Congressional group, aided by our colleague Professor John C. Coffee, 
introduced in the 114th Congress a proposed statute,230 the Insider Trading Prohibition Act 
 
 224.  See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 225.  See supra Part IV.D. 
 226.  See supra note 217 and accompanying text. Such a trade would very likely be a Rule 10b-5 violation in 
circuits that do not impose the personal benefit rule in cases where the information is not from within the issuer, 
the position that we believe is doctrinally correct. See supra Part V.A.1.b.iv;.Part V.2.d. 
 227.  This would not include the planned purchase or sale itself, which would be prompted by the analysis, 
not by the information that it was planned.  
 228.  See supra Part V.A.1.b.ii;.Part V.2.d. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., How to Get Away with Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/23/opinion/how-to-get-away-with-insider-trading.html?_r=0. 
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(the “Trading Act”),231 that would provide a comprehensive scheme to regulate informed 
trading. The Trading Act prohibits trades in an issuer’s securities if the trader is in 
possession of material nonpublic information and the trader “knows, or recklessly 
disregards, that such information has been obtained wrongfully, or that such [trade] would 
constitute a wrongful use of such information.”232 It also prohibits communication of such 
information if the communication is wrongful or the communicator has good reason to 
believe the information was obtained wrongfully and the recipient (or a direct or indirect 
tippee of the recipient) predictably trades on it.233 A trade or communication would be a 
wrongful use of such information if it is obtained by such illegal acts as theft or constitutes 
misappropriation of the information.234 Knowledge that information has been wrongfully 
obtained requires only that the trader or communicator “was aware, or recklessly 
disregarded that such information was wrongfully obtained or communicated.”235 
a. Fundamental Value, Announcement, and Issuer Insider Informed Trading 
The Trading Act would allow fundamental value-informed trading because such 
information is not wrongfully obtained, nor is it contrary to any other law or obligation.  
The Trading Act also would allow announcement trading because it is based on public 
information. It also would prohibit issuer insiders from trading on material non-public 
information from inside the issuer because, as a breach of the relationship of trust that 
issuer insiders have with the issuer’s shareholders, it is wrongful. The Trading Act would 
permit trading by issuer insiders on the basis of immaterial information from inside the 
issuer because the Trading Act only relates to material information. Thus, in all these 
regards, the Trading Act, like Rule 10b-5, prohibits all the kinds of informed trading that 
Part IV suggests should be prohibited and allows all the kinds that it suggests should be 
allowed. 
b. Tippers and Tippees with Regard to Information from within the Issuer 
With regard to tippers and tippees of information from within the issuer, the Trading 
Act, judged by the recommendations in Part IV, is superior to Rule 10b-5, though still not 
optimal in its reach. Consider analyst interviews. The Trading Act, although it does not 
explicitly include a personal benefit test, would appear to avoid chilling analyst interviews. 
If an issuer representative authorized to conduct an analyst interview accidentally provides 
material inside information, he has not communicated the information wrongfully, which 
is what would be required for a violation. Because the information was not wrongfully 
communicated to the analyst, she also would not violate the Trading Act by trading on it 
or communicating it, directly or indirectly, to someone who predictably trades on it. For 
the same reasons neither of the Trading Act’s twin prohibitions—wrongful use and use of 
wrongfully obtained information—is triggered if the information received by the analyst is 
then passed on to others (beyond the analyst’s principal) who trade on it or recommunicate 
it to yet others who predictably trade on it. 
 
 231.  Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 232.  Id. § 16A(a). 
 233.  Id. § 16A(b)(2). 
 234.  Id. § 16A(c)(1)(C). 
 235.  Id. § 16A(c)(2). 
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The immunization of the issuer representative and the analyst is consistent with our 
policy conclusions. The immunization of the indirect recipients is not consistent with our 
policy recommendations: the indirect recipient’s trades result in the same damage to 
liquidity as trades by insiders and immunizing them is not necessary to avoid chilling 
analyst interviews. They would be immunized in a Rule 10b-5 regime also, however, and 
so the Trading Act is not a step backward in this regard, though not as good as our proposed 
alternative. 
Relative to the current Rule 10b-5 case-law based regime, the major advantage of the 
Trading Act with respect to information from within an issuer relates to direct and indirect 
tippees outside of the analyst interview context. The Trading Act prohibits trades and 
tipping by persons possessing material nonpublic information “if such person knows, or 
recklessly disregards, that such information has been obtained wrongfully.”236 Unlike the 
Rule 10b-5 regime, the Trading Act explicitly does not require that the person to “know 
the specific means by which the information was obtained or communicated, or whether 
any personal benefit was paid or promised.”237 This eliminates major obstacles under the 
current Rule 10b-5 regime to imposing sanctions on tippees, especially indirect ones. 
Again, however, it does not go as far as would an optimal regime, which would prohibit 
any trade or tip if the indirect tippee has good reason to know that the nonpublic material 
information came from within the issuer. 
c. Trades based on information originating from within a non-issuer institution 
Consider now the reach of the Trading Act’s prohibitions with respect to trades based 
on nonpublic material information generated by a non-issuer institution and traded on by 
an insider of the institution or by an outsider. We concluded earlier that such trades are 
socially desirable if approved by the institution and, in case of a trade by any indirect 
outside recipient of the information, approved by the intermediary recipient or 
recipients.238 The basis of approval comes from what can grow to be a whole network of 
agreements and duties specifying who is allowed to trade and under what conditions. We 
concluded that any trading not approved by this network of agreements and duties is 
socially undesirable.239 
The Trading Act helps in two ways to prevent trades outside of what is permitted by 
this network of agreements. First, it prohibits anyone from trading on the information, or 
communicating it to others who predictably trade on it, where such trading or tipping is 
wrongful. Thus, the Trading Act is violated by an insider, or any outside recipient, direct 
or indirect, who trades or tips contrary to his agreement with his source or to some other 
legal duty.240 This prohibition, therefore, reinforces the already existing legal sanctions for 
the recipient’s breach of contract with his source or of some other duty. 
Second, the Trading Act prohibits trades or tips based on the information where the 
user has good reason to believe it was wrongfully obtained or communicated.241 These are 
persons not themselves bound by any agreement or other obligation not to trade or tip. 
 
 236.  H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. § 16A(a) (2015). 
 237.  Id. § 16A(C)(2). 
 238.  See supra Part IV.D.1. 
 239.  See supra Part IV.D.2. 
 240.  H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. § 16A(c)(C) (2015). 
 241.  Id. § 16A(b). 
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Instead they receive the information as the result of a breach by someone who was so 
bound. This prohibition acts as a backstop to help prevent trades that would otherwise occur 
as a result of the breach by the person who was so bound. 
In these regards, the reach of the Trading Act’s prohibitions are identical with the 
reach of what we believe, doctrinally and policy wise, is the better view of reach of Rule 
10b-5 based on the misappropriation theory, the view that does not insert the personal 
benefit test. The Trading Act’s contains an explicit provision that no showing of knowledge 
of personal benefit is required to establish a case based on the use of information 
wrongfully obtained or communicated. 
An optimal regime would go further, however, and prohibit any trade based on 
material nonpublic information relating to an issuer generated by an outside institution 
where the trader (1) has good reason to believe that it originated with that institution, and 
(2) does not have a good reason to believe that trade is in accordance with what is called 
for by the network agreements and duties associated with the authorized dispersion of the 
information and approval to trade on it. Given the value of material nonpublic information, 
it is predictable that the institution that generated it and each subsequent legitimate 
recipient would lay down terms for its use such that, if the terms were respected, the 
information would not be available to be freely picked up and traded upon. Thus, if 
someone trades on the basis of such nonpublic information that she has reason to believe 
came from the institution and she does not know the route by which the information got to 
her, the likelihood is that the trade is not in accordance with what is called for by the 
applicable network of agreements relating to this piece of information.  Accordingly, the 
trade is socially undesirable. 
3. An Alternative Approach 
As the preceding discussion shows, judged against what would be optimal, the reach 
of the EU Market Abuse Directive’s prohibitions on informed trading is in some ways an 
improvement upon the reach of the current U.S. Rule 10b-5 regime and in some ways is 
less satisfactory. The proposed Insider Trading Regulation Act is an unambiguous 
improvement, but still falls short of the optimal set of prohibitions. 
One way for the United States to have an optimal regime is to adopt a broad scale 
statute that goes a step further than the proposed Insider Trading Regulation Act by 
including within its prohibitions the socially harmful trades specified above that the 
Trading Act does not reach. However, a preferable and more conservative approach would 
be to recognize that the current Rule 10b-5 regulation already gets most things right and 
provides a rich set of precedents. For an extended period of time, these precedents will 
generally provide more predictable outcomes than will a whole new statutory scheme with 
all the interpretative issues of first impression that its wording will inevitably raise.  All 
that is really necessary to convert the current Rule 10b-5 regime into one that imposes the 
optimal range of informed trading prohibitions is a narrowly crafted statute that 
appropriately clarifies the ambiguities in the current case law and provides the desirable 
extensions in the range of prohibitions. 
As we have seen, all of the shortcomings of the Rule 10b-5 regime relate to tipping 
and trading by direct and indirect tippees. With regard to material nonpublic information 
from within an issuer, the statute should provide that the personal benefit test only apply 
to an issuer insider and his direct recipient, not to indirect tippees, and that evidentiary 
burden be reversed so that it simply provides a defendant with an affirmative defense if he 
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can produce persuasive evidence that the insider source disclosed for a reason other than 
personal benefit. Other than the trades and communications that are covered by this limited 
personal benefit rule, the statute should prohibit any trade (and any tip that predictably 
results in a trade) where the trader or tipper is in possession of material nonpublic 
information and has good reason to believe that it came from within the issuer. The statute 
should also clarify that the personal benefit rule does not apply to trades or tips based on 
material nonpublic information generated by an institution other than the issuer. 
Finally, as discussed just above in the analysis of the Trading Act, the object of 
regulating tips and trades based on such information is to maximize the incentives for such 
institutions to generate such information with the attendant socially useful enhancement of 
share price accuracy. To accomplish this, the statute should prohibit any tip or trade based 
on such information where the trader has good reason to believe that it originated with that 
institution and does not have a good reason to believe that (1) the institution generating the 
information authorized its initial disclosure; (2) each subsequent recommunication, if any, 
was authorized by institution that received it (where the recipient in fact was an institution 
rather than an individual), was made in accordance with the terms imposed by the 
originating institution and by each preceding recommunicating entity, and was not 
prohibited by any other obligation arising from its status; and (3) the tip or trade itself is in 
accordance with the terms imposed by the originating institution and by each preceding 
recommunicating institution and is not prohibited by any other obligation of the tipper or 
trader arising out of its status. 
 E. Mandatory Affirmative Disclosure 
The United States, through multiple trigger mechanisms, imposes its Exchange Act 
periodic disclosure regime on most of the country’s publicly traded issuers.242 This regime 
requires the issuer, on a regular basis, to answer in a filing a large number of questions 
concerning its business and finances. The most detailed filing is the annual 10-K filing, 
with some of its questions requiring updating each quarter in a 10-Q filing. Specified 
important events such as entering into important agreements, changes in control, senior 
officer changes and material asset acquisitions and sales trigger an 8-K filing obligation 
within four business days of the event. The U.S. periodic disclosure regime also includes 
Regulation FD, which is intended to be an antidote to some corporations’ practice of 
selectively disclosing material information to certain outsiders who are expected to trade 
on it. Each European country has its own somewhat different mandatory disclosure system, 
but they are all shaped by an EU directive mandating that they all have a requirement that 
the issuer disclose all new nonpublic information as soon as possible. 
1. The Relationship of Mandatory Affirmative Disclosure to Informed Trading 
One purpose of affirmative disclosure requirements is to directly make share prices 
more accurate. The efficient market hypothesis tells us that once information is publicly 
 
 242.  See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1934) (prohibiting the trading of a 
security on a national securities exchange that is not registered on such an exchange); 15 U.S.C. § 12(g) (1934) 
(requiring issuers with stocks with more than specific numbers of holders of record or assets to register as public 
companies); 15 U.S.C. § 15(d) (1934) (requiring registration in connection with a public offering). 
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disclosed this way, it is fully reflected in price very quickly.243 Affirmative disclosure 
requirements, however, have a second important function as well: reducing or eliminating 
informed trading based on the information and the reduction in liquidity that accompanies 
such trading. The less information from within an issuer is nonpublic, the less insiders and 
their tippees can engage in their socially undesirable type of informed trade. 
The benefits of mandatory disclosure go beyond this, however. The increased liquidity 
in an issuer’s stock resulting from less issuer insider informed trading means that 
fundamental value traders face lower trading costs and hence will increase their level of 
activity. In other words, there will be less crowding out of this socially valuable 
fundamental value informed trading. Admittedly, because securities filings are pubic 
announcements, more mandatory disclosure means there will be more announcement 
trading, which is also socially undesirable. However, announcement traders have only a 
very short time to act and so their trades in aggregate damage liquidity much less than 
would have the trades by insiders and their tippees. Moreover, even this minor damage to 
liquidity could be largely avoided if the release of the content of a filing was postponed 
until after the end of regular trading hours and firms were similarly constrained in their 
own announcements absent a pressing need such as stemming a developing flood of trading 
by insiders and their tippees.244 
Mandatory disclosure can favorably affect the level of fundamental value informed 
trading in another way as well. When an issuer discloses more about itself, fundamental 
value informed traders may find it easier, and thus more profitable, to analyze additional 
information about that issuer, simply because the disclosed information is a worthwhile 
input that informs further discovery. Thus, ceteris paribus, it will be more profitable for an 
investor to gather and analyze new information concerning an issuer that has disclosed 
basic financial information than an issuer who has not made such a disclosure.245 
2. Regulation FD 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD),246 adopted in August 2000, is intended to stop 
the practice of “selective disclosure.” Selective disclosure involves an issuer who discloses 
material information to certain outsiders, such as analysts, major shareholders, or other 
institutional investors, who are likely to trade on that information, but does not disclose it 
to the general public.247 Reg. FD provides that where material information is intentionally 
disclosed to such outsiders, the issuer must disclose the information to the general public 
at the same time, and where it is unintentional, the issuer must make the information 
 
 243.  Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 
(1970).  
 244.  This result could be effected not only by government regulation, but instead by stock exchange rules. 
Currently the NYSE provides that where a disclosure is to be made during trading hours, NYSE should be notified, 
and it will consider whether trading should be temporarily halted. N.Y.S.E. Manual (CCH) § 202.06(B).F. 
NASDAQ has a similar rule. NASDAQ Rule IM-5250-1. 
 245.  While important, the details of this discussion are beyond the scope of this article. See FOX, FINANCE 
AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE, supra note 55, at  34–43; John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic 
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 728–29 (1984); Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 
99, at 405.  
 246.  SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2011). 
 247.  Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240, 247, 239). 
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publicly available promptly thereafter.248 
On the whole, the effects of Reg. FD are consistent with what our analysis in Part IV 
recommends. This analysis suggests that it would be undesirable for issuers to buy or sell 
their securities while in possession of material nonpublic information and that tipping by 
an issuer would therefore also be undesirable. The Reg. FD ban on intentional selective 
disclosure therefore makes sense. So does the requirement of prompt public disclosure after 
an unintentional selective disclosure of material information, especially when combined 
with the more limited personal benefit rule for Rule 10b-5 actions recommend here.249 On 
the one hand, we want to avoid chilling analyst interviews, which is the rationale for the 
limited personal benefit rule. On the other hand, that is the sole purpose of the personal 
benefit test. If, by accident, material information is released in an analyst interview, it is 
undesirable that it become the basis of informed trading. Reg. FD does the best that can be 
done to minimize this informed trading without chilling analyst interviews (and related 
discussion among financial professionals). 
There has been considerable controversy in the empirical literature as to whether Reg. 
FD improves price accuracy and whether it lowers the cost of capital.250 A number of 
possible stories can be told in these regards.251 The imposition of Reg. FD might have 
decreased price accuracy because previously an issuer, by providing analysts with tidbits 
of selective disclosure of material information, may have been able to attract the following 
of analysts who would otherwise not find following the issuer worthwhile.252 
Alternatively, Reg. FD might have increased price accuracy because it ended a corrupt 
game by which an issuer gave such tidbits in return for overly positive analyst reports.253 
Reg. FD’s reduction in the amount of informed trading would definitely improve liquidity 
and have a favorable effect on the cost of capital.254 If Reg. FD increased price accuracy 
as well, then it would be an unambiguous improvement from a social welfare 
perspective.255 
Regardless of which story is correct, there is a better solution that would both reduce 
the amount of informed trading and allow issuers to attract share-price-accuracy enhancing 
analyst followings: keep Reg. FD but allow issuers openly to pay analysts to follow them 
in the same way that they pay accountants to certify their accounts.  Two features of such 
an arrangement could help assure objectivity. One is the development of an analyst 
business where a reputation for objectivity is an asset that, because the reputation makes 
its reports have more value, that the analyst would not want to jeopardize by giving a falsely 
optimistic report in return for getting business. The other is to require that the arrangement 
involve a long-term contract spanning a few years, so that a bad report does not lead to an 
 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  See supra Part V.A.2.d. 
 250.  See, e.g., Anup Agrawal et al., Who Is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-Side 
Analysts Following the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rules, 79 J. BUS. 2811, 2822 (2006) (finding that analyst forecasts 
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al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital, 15 REV. ACCT. STUD. 106, 139 (2010) (finding 
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 251.  See Merritt B. Fox, Regulation FD and Foreign Issuers: Globalization’s Strains and Opportunities, 41 
VA. J. INT’L L. 653, 673–78 (2001). 
 252.  Id. at 674–75. 
 253.  Id. at 677–78. 
 254.  See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining how transactions with informed traders impact liquidity suppliers). 
 255.  Id. 
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issuer dropping the analyst in retaliation. 
3. European Continuous Disclosure Regime 
The EU Market Abuse Directive subjects issuers to a continuous disclosure regime 
concerning inside information.256 This regime requires an issuer to disclose as quickly as 
possible inside information directly involving that issuer.257 This approach has virtues and 
defects.  If an issuer suspects that insiders or their tippees are trading based on the internal 
information, then it is certainly desirable for an issuer to publicly disclose that information. 
However, if there is no reason to suspect insider trading, the issuer may have a good 
business reason to keep the information secret, which would benefit the shareholders by 
allowing the issuer to generate a larger expected cash flow. In terms of the real economy 
efficiency benefits from greater price accuracy, little is gained from a slightly earlier 
disclosure of this information. Even if the issuer can be exempted if it has such a business 
reason, placing the burden on the issuer to show the business reason may lead to earlier 
disclosure on average than is desirable out of a desire to avoid the cost and risks of a fight 
with regulators. 
F. Return of Insider Profits 
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is an express prohibition of certain forms 
of insider trading under federal law.258 Section 16(b) requires insiders to disgorge to their 
firm any profit they gain from “any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any 
equity security” of the company within a six-month period.  Although Section 10(b) is far 
better known, Section16(b) generates a considerable amount of interpretation and 
litigation.259 
Critics have suggested that Section16(b) is ineffective because all the insider has to 
do is wait six months to engage in the reverse transaction that realizes her profit. This 
Article, though, suggests it can be quite useful. It dramatically reduces insiders’ incentives 
to trade based on any form of material non-public inside information, other than 
information that should have a considerably long-term impact. This is because regardless 
of what information motivates the insider to engage in an initial transaction, whether 
purchasing or selling, the insider will have to wait six months before transacting again. 
During those six months, a large number of market-moving events are likely to impact a 
company’s stock price. Accordingly, Section16(b) makes trading based on inside 
information less attractive by mandating that insiders can only rebalance their portfolios 
after a considerable amount of time, thereby leaving them in a riskier position during the 
interim because of the reduced portfolio diversification due to the inside trade.260 The kind 
of information that will remain rational to trade on will be information likely to have a 
 
 256.  See Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC) 7 (31) (delineating rules for handling market 
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 258.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). 
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Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2091 (1994) (nothing “section 16 has been subject of more 
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 260.  Id. at 2107–38. 
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price impact only in a very long period of time, which is precisely the kind of information 
this Article suggests is most socially valuable for insiders to trade on.261 
G. Market Structure Rules 
Rules governing the structure of the stock market can also be tailored to help promote 
socially desirable trading and reduce socially undesirable trading. This is especially so with 
announcement trading, which we find socially undesirable, but which, because it involves 
information that is already public, is not prohibited by Rule 10b-5 and in any event would 
be difficult to cost-effectively regulate this way. 
We will consider two potential market structure responses briefly here—one 
involving stock exchange announcement rules and the other involving the regulation of the 
electronic connections among stock exchanges and with liquidity suppliers. 
1. Stock Exchange Announcement Rules 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Listed Company Manual requires firms to 
quickly release material new information. Section 202.05 (“Timely Disclosure of Material 
News Developments”) provides that listed companies should “release quickly to the public 
any news or information which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the 
market for its securities.”262 Section 202.06 (“Procedure for Public Release of Information; 
Trading Halts”) similarly requires that “substantive items of unusual or non-recurrent 
nature,” such as dividend announcements, mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, stock splits, 
or major management changes “should be handled on an immediate release basis.”263 
A rule that that a listed issuer should disclose important news as soon as is practical 
makes sense in terms of our analysis when an issuer has reason to suspect that important 
yet-to-be-announced news is being used as the basis of insider trading. Otherwise, 
however, it would be better that the issuer be required to wait until after trading has stopped 
for the day. To announce during the trading day is to invite announcement trading. Thus, 
revising this NYSE rule to require announcements after trading hours—so that the 
announcement will essentially be known to market makers and market participants alike 
when active trading resumes—would be beneficial. 
2. Market Connection Regulation 
The modern market’s primary liquidity suppliers, high-frequency traders (HFTs), 
utilize a number of technologies. Stocks of any significance trade on each of a number of 
different trading venues, the NYSE being just one. Each venue is essentially just a 
computer (a “matching engine”) that matches standing limit orders, which constitute the 
bids and offers, with incoming marketable orders.264 The primary source of these bids and 
 
 261.  A derivative suit under state corporation law can provide a similar remedy to Section 16(b). The theory 
is that a corporate officer or director that trades on inside information breaches her fiduciary duty to the 
corporation, and therefore should return her profits.  See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 
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 262.  NYSE Listed Company Manual, NYSE (2008), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  See supra Part III.B (discussing market attributes that impact evaluative goals).  
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offers are the modern market’s primary liquidity suppliers, HFTs.265 HFTs typically have 
computers “co-located” right next to each venues matching engine. Each of an HFTs co-
located computers is connected to each other one by high speed fiber optic cable, whereby 
it constantly updates information concerning transactions occurring in every stock in which 
they regularly trade, as well as changes in the bids and offers posted by others on each 
trading venue. This information is automatically fed into a computer that uses algorithms 
to change its own bids and offers posted at each venue.266 
Through this setup, an HFT can learn of a transaction at one venue and change its 
quotes at every other venue with lightning speed.  So, for instance, an algorithm can learn 
of a very large transaction at one venue, suggesting large orders may also be heading to the 
other venues that would transact against the HFTs’ bids or offers at these venues. The HFT 
can potentially make these changes before these large orders arrive at the other venues. 
Critics have labeled this practice of changing quotes “electronic front running” and 
have suggested various ways of stopping it involving rules relating to the use 
connections.267 This may be too narrow a view. Because the persons sending these large 
orders are informed traders, the availability of electronic front running allows HFTs to 
make these informed trades more expensive. By being better protected this way, HFTs face 
lower costs from dealing with informed traders and hence in a competitive business narrow 
their spreads.268 
Electronic front running probably has quite different effects on different types of 
informed trading. Trading in large amounts in rapid time is expensive to do as a general 
matter because it involves running through the book transacting against less and less 
favorable quotes. Thus, a trader will not do it unless the information motivating one’s trade 
is rapidly going to become fully public. The ultimate example of such a trader is an 
announcement traderthe person who trades in the brief time after the announcement 
before the price has fully adjusted. The next best example is an insider who knows of a 
corporate announcement to be made very soon. Where the information one possesses has 
a longer-term horizon before becoming publicfundamental informationthere is no 
reason to trade in massive size rapidly. Thus, electronic front running stands to make 
announcement trading, which is socially undesirable, less profitable, and may do the same 
for some issuer insider trading as well. Yet it should have no direct effect on fundamental 
value trading.269 Indeed, by discouraging announcement traders and perhaps some insider 
traders and hence lowering spreads, electronic front running is likely to help fundamental 
value traders, which is a socially desirable activity. All of this cautions against a precipitous 
adoption of reforms aimed at ending electronic front running. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article provides a general framework for analyzing the social desirability of 
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different types of informed trading. Decades of debate surrounding insider trading have 
made both academics and the public widely familiar with one type of informed 
tradinginformation obtained from within a stock’s issuer or other institution, i.e., insider 
trading. The universe of informed trading, however, is much larger. 
All informed trading makes share prices more accurate, which enhances efficiency in 
the real economy. But all informed trading also, through the trading losses imposed on 
liquidity suppliers, tends to make markets less liquid, which is costly in efficiency terms. 
There is thus a fundamental trade-off in how informed trading affects the two principal 
social functions served by the stock marketaccurate pricing and providing liquidity. 
We analyzed all of the distinct types of informed trading, and argued that doing so 
illuminates how the different types of private information nonetheless vary markedly in 
their social value. The tradeoff between the social benefits from price accuracy and the 
social costs of decreased liquidity depends importantly on the time horizon for when the 
improvement in price accuracy would otherwise occur without the informed trade. Some 
types of informed trading, such as announcement trading, impose a social cost, through 
negative effects on liquidity, while creating no social benefit. Other forms of private 
information, such as fundamental value information, also impose a cost on liquidity, but 
create important positive social benefits in terms of the incentives they create for producing 
price-accuracy-improving information that then gets reflected in price. Trading based on 
various forms of confidential information from inside issuers and from inside other 
institutions can now be placed in a broader context, revealing that while some types are 
clearly undesirable, others may, in fact, be useful. Finally, we canvassed a variety of 
regulatory reforms that could reduce the profitability of announcement-based trading and 
thus its prevalence. 
